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Abstract 
 
War Stories TV Tells:  
Genre, Gender and Post-9/11 Television 
Katherine Maeve Shannon, MA 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2018 
 
Supervisor:  Thomas Schatz, Co-Supervisor: Kathryn Fuller-Seeley  
 
Since 2003, the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars have been present on television in ways 
that are distinct from previous conflicts, yet media studies have only begun to examine how 
these contemporary war narratives are becoming more commonplace on entertainment 
television. This study is an examination of television series that have depicted US conflicts 
abroad since the 2003 invasion of Iraq in order to survey the popularization of wartime 
narratives as they are seen across a wide range of programming. Jeanine Basinger and other 
scholars like Susan Jeffords have posited that war narratives and their reproductions are 
inherently gendered texts that tend to privilege men in combat while excluding women on 
the homefront. This exclusion functions to emphasize, celebrate, and restore traditional 
notions of masculinity tied up in the homosocial nature of war. This study then asks how 
entertainment television addresses war as a domestic medium that takes part in gendered 
formulas. Looking at and beyond dramatizations of ground combat so often invoked in 
limited series like Off to War (2005) and Generation Kill (2008), this study also highlights 
the proliferation of war themes in more “feminine” genres like the soap opera. What do 
female audiences and melodrama posit that more traditional combat genres cannot? And 
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why do we insist that one informs more than the other? Looking closely at three series -- 
Taking Fire, a reality TV combat series on Discovery Channel; Army Wives, a Lifetime 
primetime soap; and Homeland, a “quality” spy drama with a female lead -- this study 
examines how genre and gender are negotiated on the small screen as they relate to 
contemporary US conflicts. Shannon argues that television’s assimilation of contemporary 
war is informed not by the nature of the conflicts themselves, but rather by gendered 
divisions embedded in TV programming and the generic formulas set forth by traditional 
combat films.  
 vii 
Table of Contents 
Introduction ....................................................................................................................1	
Theory/ Methodology .........................................................................................10	
Chapter One: “A Small Band of Brothers”: Iraq and Afghanistan in Combat 
Television ...............................................................................................................17	
The Myth of Instant Transmission: War and the Moving Image .......................20	
Band of Brothers and Reality TV .......................................................................25	
The Combat Genre on Post-9/11 Television .......................................................29	
Off to War (2004) ....................................................................................30	
Over There (2005) and Generation Kill (2008) ......................................32	
The Discovery Channel: Legitimated by Real War ............................................34	
Conclusion ..........................................................................................................40	
Chapter Two:  Lifetime Fits into the Wartime Schedule: Melodrama and All that War 
Can Allow ..............................................................................................................44	
China Beach (1988), and Major Dad (1989): A Brief History of Soapy Wars ..48	
Army Wives: The Military Melodrama ..............................................................53	
Conclusion ..........................................................................................................64	
Chapter Three: So Proudly She Hails: Combat, Melodrama, and Homeland .............68	
Women in Combat ..............................................................................................71	
Carrie as Abject Heroine: “It’s my job. It will always be my job! Don’t you get 
that?!” ............................................................................................................76	
Conclusion ..........................................................................................................84	
 viii 
Conclusion: The Looming Tower and Reproductions of 9/11 .....................................87	
Works Cited .................................................................................................................93	
  
 
 1 
Introduction 
 
Our visual apprehension of war is an occasion in which we implicitly consent or dissent 
to war or where our ambivalent relation is formulated, where we also are able to pose 
questions about what and how war is presented, and what absence structures and limns 
this visual field.  
Judith Butler, Frames of War1 
 
In war you lose your sense of the definite, hence your sense of truth itself, and therefore 
it’s safe to say that in a true war story nothing is ever absolutely true.  
Tim O’Brien, “How to Tell a True War Story”2  
 
The trailer for National Geographic Channel’s new series, The Long Road Home 
(November 2017), opens with the words “A Bold New Dramatic Series,” followed by 
several takes of American male soldiers walking along a desert road somewhere in what 
we later find out to be Baghdad. Each has an assault rifle perched into a shooting position 
and is purveying the landscape in that familiar cinematic mix of intense focus and 
precarious adrenaline. A string score gets louder and louder as they turn a street corner. 
The caption, “One of the Darkest Days of the Iraq War,” slides across the screen before we 
see a soldier kick down a door and next an explosion in the road. The trailer cuts to an 
interview with U.S Army veteran Carl Wild, whose expression is withdrawn: “You make 
memories on those days like April 4th that you never forget about.” Rapid cuts of bullet fire 
and people shouting lead into a close-up of his somewhat vacant eyes, “no matter how 
much you want to.” 
The show is a dramatization of the 2004 events of what is sometimes referred to as 
“Black Sunday,” a lethal ambush by rebel soldiers in Sadr City on a platoon of eighteen 
US soldiers providing security for the delivery of sewage tanks to the “slum” inside 
Baghdad. The siege and subsequent rescue mission left eight American soldiers dead along 
with sixty others wounded.3 The events were first related by ABC reporter Martha Raddatz 
 2 
in her 2007 book, The Long Road Home: A Story of War and Family, from which the show 
takes its title and subject matter through her time in Baghdad as an embedded journalist.4 
Raddatz even lends her authorial voice to the mini-series’ trailer, proclaiming, “You cannot 
look at them recreate those characters and not think of the real soldiers and the real 
families.” Later on, we hear from actor Michael Kelly, who plays Lt. Col. Gary Volesky. 
“I owe it to them to do this the best that I can and because the country should know,” he 
asserts as the words “Global Series Event” cross the screen and the trailer ends. In just over 
a minute, the promotional video manages to highlight the limited series’ commitment to 
accurately depicting the events at hand, its devotion to the family unit, and an overarching 
sense of gratitude to the soldiers whose stories are being told. The “real,” the “family,” and 
the “war” are the three keywords and overarching themes I find most significant within the 
trailer in regard to war narrative on television.  
I first began my research for this project with the misunderstanding that the 
American television spectacle of Iraq and Afghanistan was no longer as omnipresent as it 
had been in the early 2000s. In my view, television in general, despite entering into another 
“golden age,” seemed fairly content to avoid the topic, in both news and entertainment. 
Particularly during the Obama administration, rarely did I see images of any kind of US 
conflict abroad. Instead I was enamored with new storylines in shows like AMC’s Mad 
Men and HBO’s Girls, so immersed in the rise and discourse around niche quality 
television and its introspective character narratives, it seemed to me that this new television 
culture was at odds with the more traditional war genre. And since Obama’s campaign 
promised that the troops would finally be coming home and Guantanamo would officially 
shut down, gone were the endlessly repeated images of the Saddam Hussein statue toppling 
and the prisoner at Abu Ghraib standing with a black bag over his head. This project then 
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started with the question: Why is war not represented on entertainment television like it is 
in film or on news outlets? 
I expected the more typical answers, like television’s long history of commercial 
sponsorship or federal regulation, factors that would most likely prevent controversial, 
often violent images from making it to air. I later realized this was not the case; I simply 
was not the target audience for such content. In actuality, The Long Road Home is not the 
“bold” and “new” dramatic series it claims to be as. In the past year alone, some fifteen 
years after the first invasion of Iraq, four other new primetime military-based dramas have 
begun airing alongside the series. Brave (2017, NBC), SEAL Team (2017, CBS), Valor 
(2017, CW), and another National Geographic production, Chain of Command (2018), all 
portray both fictional and nonfictional accounts of military conflict in the Middle East. 
“The military may be having a TV moment,” observed New York Times TV critic James 
Poniewozik on August 31, 2017, remarking on this rising visibility of war in our primetime 
slots.5  
 I understand The Long Road Home and highlight its promotion here as just one of 
many American military dramas to choose from in this current moment. The new series is,  
for several reasons, exemplary of what has now become a rather standard formula for the 
depiction of our ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. It features first and foremost a 
team of majority white and exclusively male soldiers maneuvering their way through a 
mission gone unpredictably wrong, often due to misjudgment of higher command or 
misguided military policies in general. The mission is framed as a failing of both the 
government, for its inability to protect its soldiers, and in the case of The Long Road Home, 
a failing of Iraqi rebel soldiers, for not complying with the US agenda. The narrative then 
centers around the depiction and celebration of American male soldiers as they endure the 
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burden of both of these failings, their success ultimately being their “long road home” back 
to civilian life.  
Emphases on the real and the family are almost always utilized as reasons to tell 
and reasons to watch these stories on television, as Raddatz suggests. Claiming “the real” 
assures a sense of objectivity, where dramatizations of ongoing conflicts are seen in these 
“television events” as rare access points for audiences and civilians who do not otherwise 
have permission to see what’s going on overseas. To watch and to think of “the real soldiers 
and their real families” is also to feel a sense of gratitude for those that have given their 
service for the country. In many ways, shows like The Long Road Home and others I will 
discuss in this project are sites where viewing becomes, or might be seen as, a patriotic act. 
In its review for the eight-episode mini-series, Variety called The Long Road Home 
“powerfully affecting,” while also positing that it “comes very close to propaganda.” 
Despite this arguably damning juxtaposition, the trade publication ultimately applauded 
the show, saying it “excelled in its depictions of logistics and bravery” amongst its male 
leads.6 The tenuous logic of Variety’s critique and its following praise is representative of 
our often contradictory relationship to war media in general, where on the one hand, we 
are aware of or suspect propagandist qualities, and yet, on the other, are beholden or 
encouraged to embrace them because of the patriotic duty we feel the text is performing.  
Since 9/11, this war formula has ever so slowly and enduringly made inroads into 
the television industry. Following a similar trajectory to the film industry’s progression of 
post 9/11 war films, where films released closer to the 2003 invasion of Iraq like In the 
Valley of Elah (2007), Lions for Lambs (2007), and Stop Loss (2008) performed rather 
minimally at the box office (Lions for Lambs did the best with $15 million), and later films 
like Kathryn Bigelow’s Hurt Locker (2008) and Clint Eastwood’s American Sniper (2014) 
earned much higher box office numbers as well as critical acclaim.7 Television coverage 
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has followed a similar pattern, starting off small and rather unnoticed, before presenting 
bigger and longer wartime narratives in the late 2000s. Discovery Time’s 2004 
documentary mini-series Off to War was television’s first attempt at a show that exclusively 
focused on Iraq. The now defunct cable network – a short-lived partnership between 
Discovery Channel and The New York Times - gave the series little circulation despite 
positive reviews. Steven Bochco’s Over There (FX, 2005), the first television drama to 
depict the war in Iraq, lasted only one season before being canceled.1 It wasn’t until 2008 
that HBO released its highly acclaimed seven-part mini-series, Generation Kill, earning 
eleven Primetime Emmy nominations. The New York Times called it, “bold, 
uncompromising, and oddly diffident.”8  
The “war on terror,” however, has made more grounded footing on American 
screens, as other scholars have pointed out, than traditional combat focused series from the 
very onset of 9/11, as best seen in Fox’s 24, which aired for an unprecedented nine seasons 
between 2001 and 2010, even reappearing in two reboots, 24: Live Another Day (2013) 
and 24: Legacy (2017). The terrorist/ spy-thriller plotline leaked into many of our cable 
dramas rather discretely, showing up in later episodes of JAG (CBS 1997-2005) and NCIS: 
Los Angeles (CBS 2009) before Showtime’s Homeland (2011) was even on the scene. 
Other shows like CBS’s The Unit (2006) and USA’s Covert Affairs (2010) also focused on 
elite military operations within Special Forces and the CIA, occasionally focusing on 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
                                                
1 Wartime narratives also cropped up in singular episodes and sub-plots of select series: an hour-long 
episode of FX’s Louie in 2011 entitled “Duckling” depicts the comedian in Afghanistan as he tours for the 
USO and performs for different troops in the region; the character of Dr. Owen Hunt on ABC’s Grey’s 
Anatomy (2005) suffers from PTSD from his former years working as a surgeon for the US Army in Iraq, 
etc. In order to limit the scope of my project, I do not explore the probable countless times non-war series 
have implemented small nods to conflicts abroad.   
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While there was indeed a moment of silence in the television entertainment industry 
at first amidst the newsroom dominance after 9/11, dramatic depictions and fictionalized 
narratives of the multitude of offensive strategies that followed in Iraq and Afghanistan 
have made significant inroads across our television landscape, moving from subplots and 
minor characters into fully serialized shows. For better or worse, the US conflicts in the 
Middle East have certainly seeped into the popular modes of American television.  
This project is interested in examining the trends and patterns within television that 
have worked to produce such formulas present in shows like The Long Road Home by 
looking specifically at the industry practices and genre codes that occupy our post-9/11 
televisual landscape. Scholarship has been solely lacking in this area. Most of our attention 
regarding the war genre has been dedicated to feature films, only rarely looking at 
television to consider popular representation and discourse around the ongoing US 
conflicts. It is my intention to focus on to the small screen and survey when and where 
television has attempted to address a country that has been perpetually at war since 2003. 
Given the medium’s unique qualities of seriality and its attachment to more arduous 
formulas, what can television posit about our never-ending conflicts that other mediums 
cannot? How are war narratives shaped through television, especially given the medium’s 
historical attachment to the domestic setting? Thus, I will be looking at explicit depictions 
of Iraq and Afghanistan and wartime culture and asking what narratives do they tell. 
Ultimately, I ask what the television industry and our televisual practices have to 
say about the relationship American audiences have with US military conflicts. As more 
popular and formulaic narratives begin to appear on television in lengthier serialized forms, 
I assess what we can make of television’s assimilation in the war genre as these narratives 
become entrenched with perceptions of the nation state.  Since 2003, the Iraq War has been 
present on television in ways that are distinct from previous conflicts, yet media studies 
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have only begun to examine ways in which contemporary war narratives are becoming 
popularized on television. 
As mentioned earlier, war is hard to watch. Beyond what can often feel like the 
excessive violence of a Marvel film, it also feels tenuous as civilians, or the “non-warrior 
caste,” as Phil Klay recently put it to claim a right to exercise critique.9 Audiences, scholars, 
and critics alike must deal with the tension, which is only worsened with a government that 
fails to properly justify or even explain military actions, as seen most recently with 
President Trump’s decision to bomb Syria. War on screen, whether real or dramatized - 
often a thin line - is difficult to analyze for copious reasons. In Regarding the Pain of 
Others, Susan Sontag illustrates the precarity of such observations: 
It has become a cliché of the cosmopolitan discussion of images of atrocity to 
assume that they have little effect and that there is something innately cynical 
about their diffusion. As important as people now believe images of war to be, 
this does not dispel the suspicion that lingers about the interest in these images, 
and the intentions of those who produce them.10 
The American audience has experienced various and plentiful forms of media reporting on 
and depictions of international conflicts, whether on radio, television, film, or the Internet. 
Alongside this coverage has been a fear or deep skepticism about the power and, as Sontag 
writes, “intentions” of these mediums and their content. Indeed, the sheer quantity and 
repetitive, cyclical nature of these images paves the way for both fascination and “innate 
cynicism” within their very design. From the rise of the Hollywood’s WWII combat film 
to the network television coverage of Vietnam to CNN’s live 24/7 broadcast of the Gulf 
War and to drone footage of US bombings in Afghanistan, Americans have witnessed 
global conflicts through a mediated lens. This lens is often enmeshed with government 
intervention, industry entertainment practices, and misinformation. As Variety rather 
casually observed, many things often “come close” to “feeling like” propaganda.    
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Despite television studies becoming more popular and more legitimated over the 
past forty years, little has been done to address its unique capacity to deliver images of war, 
despite our insistence of television’s increasing cultural significance. Too often questions 
about violence and hyper-partisanship overwhelm popular and critical discourses so they 
tend towards outdated media effects arguments. Cultural scholar and poet Maggie Nelson 
expresses this ambivalent relationship well in her essay, “Theaters of Cruelty”: “it may 
simply be that the time for the efficacy of such an enterprise has passed - not because our 
complicity has lessened or grown any less toxic, but because the enormity of certain 
geopolitical crises has made a viewer’s complicity in the presumed evils of spectatorship 
seem like small potatoes. (Yes, we like to watch, but so what?)”11 Television often exists 
as the place of blame for why we misunderstand the world because of its “info-tainment” 
culture, yet in the same breadth, our personal viewing practices are easily written off as 
static buzz in the context of larger global issues. As an avid viewer of Homeland myself, I 
often juggle deep feelings of complicity, ambivalence, and fascination as I find myself 
pulling for Carrie Mathison in her many chaotic pursuits, often chalking up the implications 
of my enthusiasm for the show as “small potatoes.” How can we begin to talk about our 
understanding of war in relation to television without diverging into these two opposing 
sentiments?  
Television and film scholars have long worked to debunk simplistic media effects 
arguments that understand audiences as “passive” or “uninformed.”  Television scholarship 
in particular has illustrated the myriad ways viewers can encounter and interpret texts 
alongside seemingly dominating industry patterns. Amanda Lotz’s term, “post-network 
age,” describes TV in the 21st century “as it increasingly exists as an electronic newsstand 
through which a diverse and segmented society pursues deliberately targeted interests.”12 
The post-network era points to a shift toward a fragmented mass audience wherein 
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television programming and viewing practices are defined increasingly by narrow-casting 
and what is often called “niche” programming, emphasizing consumer choice and wider 
ranges of content. Additionally, television, according to John Corner, is in a “post-
documentary” age, wherein the traditional documentary form has been disrupted through 
its appropriation by the explosive growth of reality TV and other semi-fictional 
programming. Consequently its aesthetics and values now constantly co-opted for more 
entertainment-driven content.13 Network branding and other patterned disruptions of genre 
are now likely to determine what kind of information we can expect to receive, further 
complicating our negotiations with television texts and promises of encountering “the 
real.”  
In her comprehensive book, Terrorism TV: Popular Entertainment in Post-9/11 
America, Stacey Takacs examines what she understands as the “trauma frame,” where the 
embellishing of American victimhood after 9/11 was “produced by melodramatic news 
coverage of the attacks, and exacerbated in the popular culture that followed,” thereby 
“ripping the terrorist attacks from their historical moorings.”14 Takacs examines a wide 
range of television programming including a 2004 episode of Gilmore Girls, a 2001 South 
Park episode entitled “Osama Bin Laden Has Farty Pants,” Arrested Development, and of 
course the usual suspects like 24 and other terror/war shows mentioned already. Takacs 
purports that this broad array of entertainment shows, particularly those on subscription 
channels not beholden to advertising sponsorships, are capable of doing more cultural and 
intellectual work than politicians appearing in newsroom bits, explicitly defining television 
as a “cultural forum,” involing scholars Newcomb and Hirsch to make sense of the ways 
in which audiences and industries negotiate with one another in terms of content and 
values. 15 She writes, “while television as a whole has clearly reproduced key aspects of the 
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political discourse and practice associated with the War on Terror, it has also provided 
opportunities for viewers to process events in new ways.” 
Takacs and television scholar Anna Froula have also done fascinating work 
together in the recent years on television’s role in the dispersion of war images and 
narratives in their edited volume, American Militarism on the Small Screen. This 2016 
collection is comprised of three sections: “World War II on the Small Screen,” “Korea and 
Vietnam on the Small Screen,” and “Contemporary Conflicts on the Small Screen.” They 
pose the same question I pose here: “What might television programs about war and 
militarism, specifically scripted, entertainment programs about these topics, be said to add 
to the war genre?”16 I see this project then as contributing to the work Froula and Takacs 
have already initiated. However, I understand gender as a significant factor within this 
question of war programming. Given that gendered constructs are embedded in both the 
war film genre and television frameworks already, how might they inform and effect new 
war narratives? 
THEORY/ METHODOLOGY 
In order to address the impact of television culture on war narratives and vice versa, 
my scope will be limited, like that of Froula and Takacs, to entertainment shows that 
explicitly portray war content. My analysis also will utilize Jeanine Basinger’s analysis of 
the Hollywood war film. Basinger writes: 
The war film itself does not exist in a coherent generic form. Different wars 
inspire different genres. ‘War’ is a setting, and it is also an issue. If you fight it, 
you have a combat film; if you sit home and worry about it, you have a family or 
domestic film; if you sit in board rooms and plan it, you have a historical 
biography or a political film of some sort.17 
I am most interested in her delineation here between the combat film and the domestic or 
“homefront” film; in one “you fight” the war, while in the other, “you sit at home and worry 
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about it.” Such distinctions are still deeply prevalent in war content today and because of 
the homosocial nature of war itself, have extremely gendered consequences. Genres can be 
seen as a “cultural product, constituted by media practices and subject to ongoing change 
and redefinition,” as described by Jason Mittel.18 It is often also a marker of gendered 
narratives, whereby the combat film is dominated by notions of masculinity and the 
domestic “home-front” genre is defined by its very exclusion from combat, where those 
that “sit and worry” are immediately feminized. This exclusion functions to emphasize, 
celebrate, and, in some cases, restore traditional notions of masculinity tied up in the 
homosociality of war. 
Television itself historically has been viewed as a “feminine” medium, not only 
because of its history of tailoring programming to 1950s housewives but also because of 
the presumably domesticated and passive engagement by those that watch it. With the 
expansion and success of subscription channels like HBO and Showtime, television is 
typically thought of as “better” than it once was, removing at times the accusation of 
“passivity” from certain programs and installing instead a higher, more active take on 
viewership, closer to cinema and other high art forms. Michael Newman and Elana Levine 
in Legitimating Television consider this a naïve notion. They argue that it is “primarily 
cultural elites who have intensified the legitimation of television by investing the medium 
with aesthetic and other prized values, nudging it closer to more established arts and 
cultural forms and preserving their privileged status in return.”19 Prestige, cinematic 
character-driven dramas like The Sopranos, Mad Men, and Breaking Bad have become a 
centerpiece to TV’s third golden age and often monopolize discussions of what kinds of 
television are worthy of study. Critical and scholarly attention often construct and then 
reaffirm these categories rather than question them. My research will in many ways assert 
that markers of “quality” are more indicative of higher social norms and class politics than 
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they are of the significance of the show itself. We will see this many times over in terms 
of which war media are classified as “quality” and which are not.  Critical attention and 
scholarly attention often construct and then restate and ultimately reify these categories 
rather than question them.  
Questions of quality and gender in the case of the war genre is particularly 
significant because they, like genre and networks, are intimately tied to questions of 
information. We see this throughout the history of the war film. In order to be good, it not 
only must be entertaining but we must feel as though we’ve been informed of something 
as well. We must feel as though what we have seen is attempting to establish a kind of 
objective representation of things we do not typically have access to. One obvious example 
of this is Steven Spielberg’s painstakingly lengthy and gory opening to Saving Private 
Ryan (1998), which was promoted as and still considered to be an accurate representation 
of the events of D-Day on the beaches of Normandy. Not shying away from blood and guts 
spilling out in the sand and limbs flying out of shell explosions, Spielberg insists the noise 
and violence are essential to what it must have looked and felt like on that day. This 
commitment to a kind of standard of war reality made Saving Private Ryan one of the most 
critically acclaimed war films of all time.  
In this current televisual climate where the average viewer has more options than 
ever imagined, where “quality” TV continues to be legitimated as a new art form, and 
where the rise in reality TV offers up new and inexpensive docu-style entertainment, I aim 
to examine how contemporary military conflicts make space and negotiate narratives 
within a medium that is highly regimented by class structures and gender coding. This 
intervention, which will largely deploy critical discourse analysis of the series in question 
alongside my own analysis of gendered narratives within the series themselves.  
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The first chapter is a brief survey of contemporary shows that qualify as some form 
of the combat genre. Following Basinger, this chapter will show how images of “boots on 
the ground” now play out on television to illustrate the many ways in which the traditional 
masculine combat film that deals with “fighting the war” has adapted and evolved over the 
last decade and where it resides now. If audiences feel as though they are watching men 
“fighting,” how does this masculine mode effect questions of reception and information?  
The major shows under examination are FX’s Over There, Discovery Times’ Off to War, 
HBO’s Generation Kill, and Discovery’s Taking Fire, along with other minor examples 
such as The Long Road Home. Questions of quality, legitimacy, critical discourse, and 
“responsibility” will come into play in this chapter as these shows are most likely to fall 
under the umbrella of war media with more explicit standards to inform.  
The second chapter is a case study of Army Wives, a Lifetime primetime soap opera 
that aired from 2006 to 2012, lasting an impressive seven seasons. It falls under what I 
consider Basinger’s “domestic” genre, where the soap represents a major shift in popular 
war media thanks to the seemingly perpetual qualities of the Iraq War. I consider the show 
in many ways to be antithetical to the shows surveyed in the first chapter, with its duration 
and emphasis on the homefront being its two most distinctive features. Scholars like Susan 
Jeffords and Lauren Rabinowitz have pointed out that daytime soaps failed to address 
topical issues in their time slots during Vietnam and the Gulf War, and thus I see Lifetime’s 
decision to create a show exclusively about people dealing with the war as representative 
of a major shift within the history of the soap and in television in general. I also keep 
feminist scholar Charlotte Brunsdon in mind, who observes that soaps invoke, “culturally 
constructed skills of femininity – sensitivity, perception, intuition and the necessary 
privileging of the concerns of personal life” – skills that are built upon and practiced 
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through the domestic/ soap genre.20 In the case of Army Wives, how do these skills engage 
our perceptions of war media differently than the combat genre?  
My third chapter will look at Showtime’s Homeland as a culmination of the genres 
and gendered television traditions discussed in the first two chapters. Of all the shows 
mentioned, Homeland has perhaps received the most critical and scholarly attention. An 
entire issue of Cinema Journal was devoted to the discussion of the show in Summer 2015, 
examining on the ways in which it plays with notions and fears surrounding terrorism. “For 
some,” writes Diane Negra and Jorie Lagerway, “Homeland progressively interrogates the 
role of women in governmental and political regimes; for others, it works to hold in place 
conservative repressions regarding homeland security profiteering.”21 On the one hand, 
discussions around quality and complex female character find critics hailing the show as 
significant and “legitimate,” yet on the other hand, Carrie Mathison’s outlandish CIA 
missions do not posit new interventions on discussions around terrorism. Scholars like 
Yvonne Tasker and James Castonguay have also examined the ways in which Homeland’s 
formula, along with terrorist-based plotlines on other shows, is heavily influenced by police 
and crime dramas like Hill Street Blues (1981) and NYPD Blue (1993). In Homeland,  
where local homicides are replaced by bomb threats and Taliban recruitments taking place 
at your local tailor replace simple bank robberies, bringing global conflicts into the 
domestic and familiar setting of the crime drama formula. This chapter will work to 
contribute to this discussion of Homeland as it ties in with other war and military dramas. 
I will argue its blend of melodrama and international conflict coupled with the placement 
of a female lead amidst predominately male CIA agents are both qualities representative 
of the many generic trends and gendered complexities taking place within the war narrative 
on television today. Having recently been renewed for a seventh and eighth season, making 
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the show the most successful of in my survey here, Homeland has dominated the discussion 
of war within the entertainment industry. 
By examining these programs and the televisual context within which they took 
shape, I aim to survey and map the routes through which U.S. conflicts come to be depicted 
on the small screen. By doing so I hope to shed more light on the ways in which war media 
operate and oscillate in the world of contemporary television and popular entertainment. 
While it is impossible to reach any kind of holistic conclusions about the political and 
global implications these shows may contain or the material effects they may have on our 
national conscious, I aim to further explore the precariousness of war narratives that are 
enmeshed in western ideals and homosocial values, and that work to affirm, and at best, 
negotiate perceptions of the nation state. Ultimately, I argue that while television has 
produced new and relevant war narratives, its assimilation of Iraq, Afghanistan and other 
contemporary US conflicts is still deeply enmeshed with pre-existing TV formulas and the 
traditional combat film, both factors defined and restricted by notions of gender. 
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Chapter One: “A Small Band of Brothers”: Iraq and Afghanistan in 
Combat Television 
“THE FOLLOWING WAS SHOT BY SOLDIERS ON THE FRONTLINE. THIS 
IS THEIR STORY.” These words appear across the blurry face of a soldier helping position 
a small camera on the helmet of his comrade in arms, the frame moving back and forth as 
the man works to adjust the device. The desert in the background and the familiar sandy 
beige camouflage worn by the soldier are our only visual cues to let us know we are 
somewhere in the Middle East. “Gotta make sure your lens is straight, dude,” he says just 
before the title sequence cuts in.  
Taking Fire is a television series which debuted in September of 2016 that consists 
of five one-hour episodes depicting soldiers based in a heavy fire zone in Afghanistan. The 
base they occupy and hence “take fire” at sits close to the border of Pakistan and 
purportedly overlooks a key weapons trade route for the Taliban. The first time I saw the 
series, I frankly couldn’t decipher if what I was watching was real or not. The use of 
footage taken directly from cameras attached to the helmets of soldiers makes Taking Fire 
look and feel quite immediate. Upon further observation, I was surprised to find the 
material was in fact real video of actual soldiers, constructed almost entirely from personal 
footage collected by members of the 101st Airborne Division in 2010, collected and edited 
by the Discovery Channel in 2016.  
In an interview with Variety, series producers Denise Contis and Joseph Schneier 
have said it was their intention to “transform the genre of the war documentary,” creating 
what Variety considers a “limited docu-series,” and thereby “allowing viewers to look at 
this world of intense stakes through a relatable prism.”22 The product is effectively a 
combat series shot from the first-person perspective. The insistence that this point of view 
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is a “relatable prism” for viewers to experience combat is a claim rife with implications, 
the primary assertion being that the positioning of the camera allows us to experience the 
war as the soldiers do and that this is a new vantage point from which to “see” the war, to 
experience combat with those that face it as a day-to-day reality. With regard to 
information, entertainment, and the documentary form, particularly for a subject as current 
and political as the War in Afghanistan, what does the existence of a show like Taking Fire 
- with this use of hyper-reality created by the helmet cameras - suggest?  
Considering that the goal of Taking Fire is for audiences to “relate” to an American 
soldier’s vantage point, we can deduce that Discovery Channel believes its audience is 
interested in or at least curious about the experience of combat. To begin this chapter, it is 
important to consider exactly what combat as a genre is and how it looks today, or at least 
how we perceive it today. What war even comes to mind when the term “combat” is 
evoked? I posit that perhaps it is not wholly our contemporary wars but a mixture of prior 
wars and the reproduction of them on screen. In her exhaustive study of World War II 
films, Jeanine Basinger writes that, “World War II gave birth to the isolation of a story 
pattern which came to be known and recognized as the combat genre whether it is 
ultimately set in World War II, in the Korean War, or in Vietnam, or inside some other 
genre such as the Western.” She also notes that before World War II, “this combat genre 
did not exist.” Genre theory has worked to examine ways in which themes and plotlines 
that fall under a specific genre category become increasingly self-referential the longer 
they are employed. In the case of WWII according to Basinger, the reproduction of the war 
becomes its own story or narrative set whose source material relies more so on prior 
reproductions than the war itself. “Genre theory is a kind of Lego set. It is a bunch of pieces 
that stay the same, but out of them you can build different things,” writes Basinger. These 
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moving parts “indicate what audiences of a particular era learned or wanted from these 
familiar genres.” 23 
This chapter traces the combat genre on television in the post-9/11 era in an effort 
to better understand the formulas that have developed, that we’ve come to expect, and to 
survey how military and geopolitical conflicts are then reproduced again and again across 
our television screens. I examinine the industrial and critical landscape of the following 
series: Off to War (2003), Over There (2004), Generation Kill (2008), and lastly Taking 
Fire (2016). In the process, I argue that the combat genre remains ardently intact, as all 
four series mentioned revolve around what Basinger coins the “journey on” narrative of 
the ground soldier. Despite the US military’s predominant use of defensive air strategies 
over the last decade, we are still preoccupied by this traditional “foot solider.” No matter 
the environment or circumstance, the threat of death from various sources and the long 
journey home remain the principal concerns for these men on the ground. We will see that 
these common narratives often render television content based in Iraq and Afghanistan 
non-exclusive to its time period and setting.  
 My notion of the combat genre branches from Basinger’s analysis as I consider 
new television modes like reality TV and “prestige” programming and their distinct roles 
in audience reception. Because of its use of hyper-reality and gamer affect, - its visual 
aesthetic, which I discuss later, resembles that of a first-person shooter video game - I see 
Taking Fire as an extreme example of “war television” that is both part of and divergent 
from this broader movement of combat television post-9/11. I argue that the further 
removed we are from 9/11 and the 2003 Iraq Invasion, the greater liberties television has 
taken to reproduce these events and conceptions of combat following them. In our post-
9/11 era, to echo Basinger, it is important to ask what audiences have “learned” and what 
they have “wanted” from these shows. What exactly we “learn” and “want” from combat 
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series will prove to be much more multifaceted and tenuous than originally laid out by 
Basinger, in terms of WWII combat films, when taking television into consideration. It is 
possible that a series like Taking Fire tells us more about television as a technology and 
cultural form than it does about the War in Afghanistan, as the producer of the show so 
boldly claims.  
THE MYTH OF INSTANT TRANSMISSION: WAR AND THE MOVING IMAGE 
 “Ever since cameras were invented in 1839, photography has kept company with 
death,” writes Susan Sontag in 2003 nonfiction work Regarding the Pain of Others. In that 
2003 nonfiction book, Sontag surveys multiple instances when images, particularly war 
images, have shaped and played with public perceptions of global conflicts, remarking on 
the multitude of ways in which photography as a medium has always been unreliable. She 
cites photographer Mathew Brady as one of the first to attempt to fully document combat 
during the American Civil War. Brady is notorious for having moved and adjusted dead 
bodies of both Union and Confederate soldiers to create dramatic shots, propping up 
bodies, shifting limbs from here to there, rearranging weapons on the fields of Gettysburg, 
etc. “What is odd is not that so many of the iconic news photos of the past appear to have 
been staged,” writes Sontag, “it is that we are surprised to learn they were staged, and 
always disappointed.”24 Images are indeed products whose construction relies on 
positionality and reproduction; a camera must take its shot from somewhere, creating a 
stage in its scope whether intentionally or not. Inevitably photos and images are at once 
products and processes of historical tampering, vulnerable to infinite interpretations and 
strategic applications.  
In our post-9/11 world, the relationship between warfare and images has only 
become more tenuous. The most obvious example that comes to mind is the footage of 
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Saddam Hussein’s statue toppling over in Firdos Square on April 9, 2003. Picked up and 
played on a continuous loop by all the major American news outlets at the time, the fall of 
the statue was used to represent the success of the US invasion in the removing of a 
dictatorship and the “freeing” of Iraq. It was later revealed that the entire event was staged 
by US psychological operations (PSYOP), a category of combat missions that deal directly 
with manipulating information as it relates to public perception.25 With the help of some 
marines, the scene intentionally looked like a spontaneous action brought on by the Iraqi 
civilians and not the US military. In actuality, Baghdad was “violent and chaotic” on April 
9th, and nowhere close to achieving any semblance of progress.26 
Other images like those of the prisoners at Abu Ghraib and more recently with the 
series of YouTube videos documenting the beheadings committed by ISIS (most 
controversial of which was the killing of US journalist James Foley) have also circulated 
and at times flooded the news landscape surrounding the war. A simply Google search 
using the search term “ISIS” brings up horrifying headlines like “ISIS beheads four-year-
old girl then forces mother to soak hands in dead daughter’s blood,” illustrating the ways 
in which the terrorist group utilizes images to shock and disturb through their distribution 
in Western media outlets.27 Indeed, the attack on the World Trade Centers can be viewed 
as orchestrated for the same reason - what Takacs calls, “maximum media exposure,” 
making 9/11 “the first salvo” in a “very long information war.”28 
War images have thus only become more manipulative and weaponized in 
exceedingly extreme ways during the information age. Jane M. Gaines has recently 
attempted some reparative thinking regarding the impact of these images in her essay, “The 
Production of Outrage: The Iraq War and the Radical Documentary Tradition”:  
One might think that the realization of the new ubiquity of moving image devices 
would make image suspicion (really “image bashing”) obsolete. But we are still in 
transition, living the paradox. In the technologically uneven and asymmetrical 
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moment, images are both distrusted and declared harbingers of a brave new world 
of instantaneity and supra-intelligence.29 
Here, she outlines the current dichotomy of whereby images at once can simultaneously 
mean everything and nothing. Her understanding of the moving image as “ubiquitous” is a 
salient proposition, one that aptly illustrates our technological moment where the majority 
of cell devices are equipped with cameras, making the act of recording as simple as literally 
lifting a finger. She fears that this common-ness of the moving image will permanently 
damage the impact and register of the documentary form, finally urging: “As makers, let 
us not be out-massed.”   
Gaines is not alone in championing the power of images and film to inform and 
make positive change regarding our contemporary conflicts, despite the mass of those 
doing otherwise (for instance, Donald Trump’s November 29th retweets of three camera 
phone videos recording examples of “Muslim violence”).30 In his 2010 book, Cinema 
Wars, Douglas Kellner argues that independent documentaries have invoked pertinent 
discussions and questions that have intervened on common narratives about the Iraq War, 
filling in gaps and voids left empty or filled with misleading information by mainstream 
news outlets. Citing films like Standard Operating Procedure (2008), Body of War (2007), 
Redacted (2007), and No End in Sight (2007) Kellner argues, “Hollywood films sharply 
critiqued salient aspects of the Bush-Cheney administration in entertainment and 
documentary cinema. They presented different and more critical visions of 9/11 and the 
so-called war on terror than either the Republican administration or the mainstream 
corporate media.”31 In some ways, it has become the objective of cinema to shed light on 
military conflicts where other media outlets have either remained silent or insist on the 
mischaracterization of US involvement. Errol Morris’s documentary Standard Operating 
Procedure (2008), for instance, takes a closer look at Abu Ghraib, disputing the common 
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narrative that a few select “bad” US soldiers were to blame for the mistreatment and abuse 
of Iraqi prisoners, rather than the poorly managed prison system and intentionally vague 
military policies on torture in place around the time the photos were taken. The film asserts 
that the mistreatment depicted in the photo leak in fact fell under “standard operating 
procedure,” and were ultimately sanctioned by the US government on several counts, thus 
illustrating the ways images can be used as evidence for one thing while covering up 
something else at the same time. What Kellner and Morris highlight is the necessity for 
documentary and other films to pick up were news outlets have left off.   
As television has become championed and deemed more “cinematic” in the last 
decade, how does it intervene within these narratives? Hyper-partisanship and the 
“ubiquity” of image making have made our traditional news outlets less and less credible 
so that we must often look elsewhere, as Gaines and Kellner have demonstrated, for more 
nuanced and explorative discussions of the war abroad. Television, because of its history 
as a medium fundamentally wed to commercial interests, particularly in the US, has always 
been relatively distrusted regarding its ability to produce objective and educational 
programs and thus achieve such discussions. Indeed, in a series of essays revolving around 
watching Vietnam on television throughout the late sixties, critic Michael Arlen writes, “I 
don’t know what gets into a television-network news department that makes it think it has 
to stand so foursquare behind the governments of the United Sates in all its comings and 
goings.” Remarking on NBC’s half-hour Vietnam Weekly Review program, which did very 
little to criticize or complicate the government’s own narrative of the war, Arlen amusingly 
bemoans, “Come off it, NBC!”32 
Indeed, television’s capacity to intervene, particularly when it comes to war 
reporting, has rarely been celebrated, let alone trusted. Yet shortly after Arlen’s rather 
devastating critique of the “Living Room War,” Raymond Williams wrote his foundational 
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text on television that posits a much more positive take on the medium. First published in 
1974 as cable television was about to explode, Williams spends a significant amount of 
time in Television: Technology and Cultural Form airing his many grievances with 
academia’s celebration and acceptance of Marshall McLuhan’s famous book The Medium 
is the Massage: An Inventory of Effects. “The physical fact of instant transmission as a 
technical possibility, has been uncritically raised to a social fact, without any pause to 
notice that virtually all such transmission is at once selected and controlled by existing 
social authorities,” he writes. His fear is one in which McLuhan’s message, which 
William’s understands primarily as an aesthetic theory, becomes co-opted as a social 
theory. If the medium is the “massage,” then television is the hypodermic needle of 
information, corrupting our brains with its flow of images, where no barrier exists between 
the screen and our consciousness. While this is not exactly McLuhan’s intended message 
(aptly so), Williams’ response is a salient one, filled with apprehension and a general 
unwillingness to condemn a technology he finds so filled with potential. “Instant 
transmission,” according to Williams, is a falsehood developed out of paranoia, an 
oversimplification of technology alienated from its social construction and social function. 
Williams posits instead that “technology, including communication technology, and 
specifically television, is at once an intention and an effect of a particular social order.”33  
It is this notion - that television brings forth both an intention as well as an array of 
its own “effectedness” - that I will use as a cornerstone for understanding Taking Fire and 
the post- 9/11 combat shows that precede it. Hirsch and Newcomb expand on Williams’ in 
their essay, “Television as a Cultural Forum,” by assessing television’s relationship to an 
existing social order as something more like a “cultural litmus test,” where factors like the 
myriad relationships between producers and audiences that function as major contributors 
to said “social order.” According to Hirsch and Newcomb, both producers and audiences 
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can be seen as interpreters of “behavior,” by defining the “permissible” and the “normal” 
regarding what is appropriate for television.34 While they make little mention of the effect 
of industry practices as more recent scholarship has pointed out and as Williams does 
somewhat with his analysis of the BBC, their understanding of television as a process that 
requires permission from audiences and producers is one worth keeping in mind, 
particularly as it connects to conversations around genre and form.  
  In the following section, I argue that permission may come less from moral values 
and notions of appropriateness than from what we’re accustomed to already as viewers and 
as habitual consumers of images. As reality television has changed our understanding of 
what’s meant to be “real” and as prestige television has dictated what’s meant to be “good,” 
how does this particular televisual social order effect what we inevitably grant permission 
to, especially if we understand these images as part of an extensive history in war-making 
and social consciousness that at times fall into the self-referential mode of genre? The 
following is a brief history of the rise of reality TV as it relates to the rise of the combat 
genre on television, as seen through HBO’s programming decisions in the early 2000s.  
BAND OF BROTHERS AND REALITY TV  
“One of the strengths of television is that it can enter areas of immediate and 
contemporary public and, in some sense, private action more fully and more powerfully 
than any other technology.” When Raymond Williams was asserting this position back in 
1974, largely in response to the increase in what he was calling “drama documentaries” on 
television at the time, PBS had recently finished airing its serial documentary series, An 
American Family. Williams called it a “fascinating” and “dramatic experience,” and took 
a moment to quell criticisms about the show’s editing style and purportedly “neutral” 
positioning within the family dynamic: “An editing technique can be used in either interest, 
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and just as there should be social controls when accurate reporting is in question, so there 
should be social opportunities when it comes to creative interpretations.” The startlingly 
honest display of the upper-middle class Loud family reportedly inspired MTV’s The Real 
World two decades later, and thus an entire teen-branded network of reality television and 
the endless spin-offs that followed (and still follow). While Williams couldn’t have 
imagined that drama documentaries would eventually lead to reality television - nor can I 
comment on the educational and public value he would ascertain it to have - he certainly 
predicted the creative explosion in which information could be projected within the form 
itself in addition to preemptively cultivating it as a high culture medium.  
Twenty-five years later, in the wake of MTV’s reality-TV-fueled teen culture 
invasion and in the midst of new ultra-popular reality competition shows like Survivor 
(2000), Big Brother (2001), and Fear Factor (2001), HBO began to assert its own stake 
within the mixed documentary form. In “I Think We Need a New Name for It,” Susan 
Murray unpacks the ways in which HBO was able to excel at producing “quality” 
documentary in the early 2000s as networks were facing looming writer’s strikes and, 
additionally, the 2000 commercial actor strike that lasted six months.35 The lack of actual 
scripts and sponsorships prompted major networks like Fox and NBC to devote more 
programming to reality TV rather than traditional scripted drama and sitcom series because 
of the reduced costs in writing and production values reality TV allows. The impact of 
reality programming on the major networks marks a significant shift within the history of 
the documentary form, not to mention primetime TV programming and scheduling. 
Overall, reality TV led to a popular embracing and revamping of a new visual and 
informational aesthetic, one in which television, across its entire spectrum, had to 
assimilate in some way.  
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Murray specifically examines PBS’s attempt at a reality/ documentary hybrid series 
in the wake of their own budget cuts with the unsuccessful American High (2001), 
understandings its failings as the beginning of HBO’s documentary takeover that follows 
in the early 2000s. PBS picked up American High as a documentary series from Fox, where 
it had been airing as a reality program. The series, which ran for thirteen half-hour  
episodes, looked at the lives of fourteen high schoolers living in Highland Park, Illinois. 
“The idea was to attract teens to PBS by making the series appear entertaining, while 
simultaneously appeasing its core audience by wrapping it in the discourse of education,” 
writes Murray. The show attempted to both focus on teen romances and drama in a similar 
vein as The Real World while also marketing it as an education source for parents and 
teachers to learn more about teenagers in the contemporary moment. “The strategy failed 
on both fronts,” she contends, arguing that “it became increasingly difficult for [PBS] not 
only to fund documentaries but also to air work that was explicit or controversial.” Later 
in 2001, following American High’s failure to capture controversial enough material for 
younger audiences and appease older viewers looking for more traditional programming, 
HBO began airing new episodes of its nonfiction anthology series America Undercover on 
a weekly basis in place of its previous monthly schedule.36 The series at this point was 
already known for its controversial content, having explored topics like prostitution, 
pedophilia, and drug use in previous episodes. TimeWarner’s press release announcing the 
new schedule and increased production includes a statement from HBO’s executive VP, 
Shiela Nevins, calling America Undercover a “great opportunity, because it provides a 
visible, regular time slot for reality programming that preserves the documentary form 
focusing on real people, real places and real feelings.”  
HBO’s emphasis on “preserving” the documentary and thus dealing with “real” 
people as opposed to the unreal people on other reality television is one of the myriad 
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strategies HBO uses to market itself as high quality and high culture, defining itself as “not 
TV,” the opposite of and the answer to commercial networks and their limitations.  
 
To court a particular type of audience identification and set of expectations, 
television networks can take a program that has somewhat liminal textual generic 
identifiers and sell it as either a documentary or a reality program by packaging it 
in such a way to appear either more educational/ informative or more entertaining/ 
sensational, or, in some cases, both. In this way, the networks are working with 
the audience’s prior experience and expectations of each form and then 
highlighting certain aspects of the text to ensure that it is read in a particular 
way.37 
Here Murray further outlines the ways in which HBO’s strategic packaging of 
America Undercover worked to distinguish itself from commercial network programming, 
striking a balance between entertainment and education that pleased audiences seeking 
more controversial content. America Undercover’s place on HBO demonstrates the 
malleability of television’s “generic identifiers” to fit within audience perceptions of the 
documentary form while also working to construct and bolster an active social brand for 
the network.  
In 2001, the same year that it began to expand its documentary content, HBO also 
released the most expensive television series produced to date with Band of Brothers. With 
names like Steven Spielberg and Tom Hanks behind it and a world premiere event on Utah 
Beach in Normandy, France, HBO was undoubtedly looking to take on a heavier weight 
class within the cinematic world in addition to their documentary content.38 Thomas Schatz 
notes that, “a limited series like Band of Brothers can scarcely be expected to attract new 
subscribers, so cultural cachet may well have been a prime motivation for HBO’s massive 
investment.”39 Housing such a prestigious project, while going against the grain of its 
smaller budget serial dramas, HBO employed big names, big budget, and big spectacle 
promotion to elevate the network’s perceived social value and significance. It could now 
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be seen as a network large enough and capable enough to reproduce and even invigorate 
something as historically significant as the American WWII narrative.  
I see the production of America Undercover and Band of Brothers coinciding in the 
same moment as illustrative of a significant industrial practice. The pair exemplify the 
ways in which perceptions of both the documentary and the combat genre, particularly the 
WWII combat genre, often work not just to entertain and inform, but to bolster and 
legitimize the networks that produce them. HBO took advantage in the early 2000s of the 
commercial network struggle to provide thoughtful entertainment - beyond what many see 
as “trashy” reality content – to redefine what it is that television is capable of. The 
documentary content does just this because of its connotation of high culture and higher 
education, as Murray and Nevins have argued. Band of Brothers exemplifies this delicate 
balance between documentary and entertainment, where the grand struggle of a war 
narrative entails deep moral perplexity ultimately resolved by masculine heroism - 
Basinger’s “journey on” sentiment - a formula that almost always demands that a level of 
seriousness be paid to it, both in a popular and a critical sense. What is perhaps so brilliant 
about selling a war narrative, then, is that it is at once perceived as informative and 
sensational, giving it a potentially massive range of appeal, regardless of whether or not it 
is perceived as one or the other. It is this implicit dichotomy that the combat shows airing 
after 9/11 so often contained or worked to embody. 
THE COMBAT GENRE ON POST-9/11 TELEVISION 
As Thomas Schatz points out, Band of Brothers happened to debut on HBO just 
two days before September 11th. “Given not only the collective psyche of the American 
public but also the massive media resources used to depict (and formulate) the War on 
Terror,” writes Schatz, “HBO’s ambitious portrayal of the Second World War and the 
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Greatest Generation now seemed oddly anachronistic.” Indeed, the grandeur and glory of 
the “last good war” depicted on Band of Brothers airing simultaneously with 24/7 breaking 
news coverage of the Trade Center towers collapsing into ash only highlighted the show’s 
oddly placed nostalgia as it continued to reproduce foreign conflicts that were wholly 
isolated and detached from the current geopolitical crisis. 
Among the critical and occasional commercial success of some Iraq War films - In 
the Valley of Elah (2007), The Hurt Locker (2008), American Sniper (2014) - networks 
since 2003 have slowly begun to take on projects that depict combat in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. The following section will survey a few key programs that illustrate 
television’s intentions, social orders, and industrial practices surrounding its depictions of 
Iraq and Afghanistan leading up to Taking Fire. 
Off to War (2004) 
Often considered one of the first television shows to seriously address the Iraq War, 
Off to War is a ten-part documentary series that aired while the invasion of Iraq was still 
ongoing. It focused on members of the Arkansas National Reserve as they prepare and 
eventually head to Iraq, depicting events both from overseas and from back home as 
families of the soldiers react to their new absence and await to hear news. More “restrained, 
probing, and reflective,” than other typical reality TV formats that the show mimics, writes 
Douglas Kellner, Off to War demonstrated television’s new abilities to take on topics and 
the nuance attached to them that only film had previously displayed. Its directors, Craig 
and Brent Renaud, were able to capture footage from families in Arkansas as well as 
footage from Iraq, having deployed with their subjects as embedded reporters, depicting 
emotional moments like the death and funeral of one of the soldiers and an unexpected 
pregnancy announcement. Its perspective highlighted the effect the massive deployments 
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were having on rural areas in particular within the US, detailing ways in which families 
were forced to struggle financially with the loss of some key breadwinners and exploring 
the naivety and lack of preparedness amongst the young men deployed.  
Yet “for all of its cultural centrality,” writes Amanda Lotz in The Television Will 
be Revolutionized, “Off to War existed in comparative obscurity on what might be 
described as an ultra-niche cable network,” contending that while it provided a once 
“inconceivable range of content” rarely seen on television, the series unfortunately aired to 
a rather minuscule audience due to Discovery Time’s limited viewership on premium 
cable. While Off to War was one of the first instances of TV coverage of the war in Iraq 
outside the realm of news programming, it existed on the short-lived Discovery Times 
Channel, a four-year partnership between Discovery Communications and The New York 
Times Co. that aimed to create investigative and documentary content. The partnership 
ended in 2006 when The New York Times pulled out to focus on video content within its 
own online platform rather than television.40 The show perhaps feels unique because of this 
temporary partnership, a commercial network coupling with a leading newspaper to create 
the very first documentary series about Iraq.  
It is not surprising that the first show to be released about the war resembles an 
interesting mixture of documentary film and reality television. Watching the trailer alone 
reveals the influence of shows like The Real World, where the use of a handheld camera 
and heavy stylized editing (in the use of slow motion and choice of music), and the frequent 
use of emotional sound bites coupled with confessional interviews by individual family 
members and the soldiers. The subtitle itself, Off to War: From Rural Arkansas to Iraq, 
mimics the narrative structure of the The Real World, wherein cast members prepare 
themselves emotionally for their journey from small-town America to a major American 
city. This narrative also embodies Basinger’s “journey on” sentiment of the American foot 
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soldier as it understands these men to be ostensibly plucked from their hometown 
communities and dropped into a deadly war zone.   
While the series does illustrate real consequences of the war, making plain the lack 
of preparedness of the National Reserve and the minimal funding given to its Arkansas 
members, Off to War functions largely in an apolitical mode. It presents Iraq from the 
viewpoint of small-town men being thrust into alien environment, taking on the voice of 
rural naivety rather than asserting its own. Although situated in Iraq, one could argue we 
see as little of that country as we do the cities in The Real World, where activity is kept 
almost entirely indoors with most of the show depicting male soldiers in their bunks 
lamenting their fears, showing their excitement, or, more typically, just goofing off.  
The next major television documentary series depicting American combat in the 
Middle East was Taking Fire in 2016, fully twelve years later on a revamped Discovery 
Channel. What we have in between are two drama series depicting yet another take on the 
initial 2003 invasion.  
Over There (2005) and Generation Kill (2008) 
The first cable drama to address Iraq was Steve Bochco’s Over There, which aired 
on FX in 2005. The show depicts the US Army’s Third Infantry Division as they complete 
their first tour of duty in Iraq. Lasting only one season with a total of 13 episodes, despite 
involvement from the Hill Street Blues, LA Law, and NYPD Blue showrunner, the series 
went down quickly with criticisms of excessive violence. It was the first of two shows to 
use the account of Rolling Stone reporter, Evan Wright - later published as a book entitled 
Generation Kill (2004) - which documented the initial 2003 invasion through the 
experience of an intimate and diverse group of men who gradually become disenchanted 
with their mission and their plight in the foreign country.   
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Bochco’s ambitious production didn’t pay off and the failure of such content left a 
sizeable silence within the entertainment television industry for some time with respect to 
the conflicts abroad. It wasn’t until 2008 that HBO released a seven-part docudrama 
miniseries about the war, this time directly adapting Wright in a show entitled Generation 
Kill. The series depicts the invasion with exact details and names of Wright’s actual United 
States Marine Corps troop (the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion), even getting some of the 
marines to play themselves. Produced by The Wire’s David Simon, the show features a 
mission-per-episode formula similar to Band of Brothers but updated with the kind of crude 
pessimism and prideful ignorance towards the Middle East amongst its soldiers seen earlier 
in films like Jarhead (2005). Nominated for eleven Primetime Emmys, Generation Kill 
was critical of the U.S. deployment, showing the marines’ frustration to learn they’re not 
there to find weapons of mass destruction as they instead must avoid enemy fire from 
insurgents coming in from Syria. They want to provide humanitarian relief for civilians but 
are ordered repeatedly to move on to the next town, creating a kind of surrealist blend of 
American ambivalence and bureaucratic absurdity as the men sing out their frustration 
through pop music while riding around in Humvees.  
What’s notable about the two shows is that many of the qualities that Over There 
was criticized for were the same qualities Generation Kill was applauded for three years 
later. It was blatantly anti-war, anti-Bush-Cheney, violent, and crude. The difference in 
reception can arguably be summed up to timing and network. Over There’s somewhat 
critical depiction of the war in Iraq debuted too soon after the 2003 invasion in order to sit 
positively with the FX audience in 2005. For HBO three years later, the ability to show 
violence, swear excessively, and take on a more liberal viewpoint were all factors promised 
and celebrated within the network’s brand.  
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As mentioned before, it is worth noting that Off to War, Over There, and Generation 
Kill all focused on the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In varying levels of critique, the three exist 
across a four-year time period throughout Bush’s second term. While it’s not surprising 
that the shows become more critical the further away from the invasion they air, it is 
alarming to see such a refusal to shift the focus away from the same event. While US 
intervention has largely been deployed in the air and through drone strikes over the last 
decade, these shows indicate that we prefer to see what’s happening on the ground to the 
soldiers on foot. By continually going back to the one of the largest ground invasions in 
modern US history, these shows posit an obsessive desire to focus on a specific and well-
known ground offensive instead of looking at the other events and other types of combat 
that have taken place in the Middle East. The shows then further establish Basinger’s 
understanding of the combat genre in their slight adjustments of identical parts, moving 
around (1) a troop of men, (2) the 2003 Invasion, and (3) a lack of preparations, in order to 
construct varying messages regarding the US instigation of and its ongoing incursion into   
Iraq. 
THE DISCOVERY CHANNEL: LEGITIMATED BY REAL WAR 
When Taking Fire arrived in 2016, the focus was no longer the invasion, but a 
group of men on base in Afghanistan, still insisting our empathy for the foot solider and an 
undying interest in ground combatAs mentioned earlier, Taking Fire is a compilation of 
personal footage shot by soldiers in the 101st Airborne Division, “showcasing everything 
from American soldiers under fire to playing pranks on each other.” Discovery insisted 
their series gives a “real, raw insight” of a current war zone that “most people have never 
experienced before.” To return to Susan Murray: “The distinctions we make between forms 
of nonfiction television are not based on empirical evidence but are largely contained in 
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the evaluative connotations that insist on separating information entertainment, liberalism 
from sensationalism, and public service from commercialism.” As generic identifiers from 
traditional documentary pave their way over to TV and then back again, it’s no longer 
enough to depend on formal visual codes to decipher between information and 
entertainment. Murray insists that our interpretation of genre, in the case of reality or 
nonfiction or drama, now depends on the “industrial management of extratextual 
discourses.”41 Network branding alongside the strategic use of generic identifiers are more 
likely to convey what strict genre categories like the documentary once did. In other words, 
networks themselves are more likely to act as signposting with regard to what kind of 
information we should expect to receive than the content in question. This is especially true 
when examining Taking Fire in the context of The Discovery Channel.  
I initially thought the helmet camera footage in Taking Fire was staged. I thought 
this for a multitude of reasons, including an excessive list of editing embellishments, but 
mostly because it would not have been the first time the Discovery Channel fooled its 
audience with fake “personal” footage. In 2012, they aired what they later called a “docu-
fiction” entitled Mermaids: The Body Found, a film which began with what looked like 
video taken from the camera phone of an innocent beach stroller coming across the body 
of a scaly, fish-like corpse in the sand. When the pedestrian got closer to the mysterious 
fleshy lump, the camera dramatically cut out just after capturing black eyes and gills 
opening in anger. The premise of the film ultimately insisted on obscure evolutional theory 
and a government cover-up to illustrate the existence of mermaids. While it did feature a 
small disclaimer during the opening credits, many viewers expressed their confusion over 
the show’s content and finely crafted appeals to conspiracy theory enthusiasts. It prompted 
an official statement from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and a 
“de-bunking” column from Wired magazine.42 For a period of time, docu-fictions like these 
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were some of the more popular staples of The Discovery Channel and on its other 
properties such as Animal Planet.  
In 2016, to the dismay of some fans, Discovery Channel dropped Mermaids from 
its Shark Week programming after three years of releasing new annual sequels. According 
to Business Insider, “its new president Rich Ross announced the removal of such 
dramatized programming, saying it wasn't ‘right’ for the network. Instead, the channel was 
planning on leaning toward more real research.”43 That same year, the network released 
Taking Fire as parts of its new crossover programming (or cross-back?) into “real 
research.” The very real documentary about the war in Afghanistan exists next to other 
Discovery programming like Alaskan Bush People, Deadliest Catch, Naked and Afraid, 
Mythbusters, Bering Sea Gold, Fast N’ Loud, and Street Outlaws. On the surface, it may 
not seem as though these titles have anything to do with each other, but Discovery 
Channel’s website recommended them to me as a viewer of Taking Fire. The network’s 
expertise now seems to lie in the hyper-masculine and the hyper-real portrayals of men 
doing manly things, like surviving in the wilderness, catching Alaskan crab, fixing cars, 
solving science riddles, and going to war. It’s important to note that the hero in all of these 
scenarios is the white working-class male, Discovery’s target audience.  
I see this move as mirroring similar tactics employed by HBO with the production 
of Band of Brothers. By using conventions of both the war documentary and the combat 
genre, Discovery Channel separates itself from less “legitimate” reality television. I 
understand “legitimate” here as understood by Newman and Levine, where “legitimation 
works in part by aligning television with that which has already been legitimated,” and by 
“distancing more respectable genres of TV associated with less valued audiences who have 
previously been seen as central to television’s cultural identity –women, children, the 
elderly, those of lower class status, people who spend their days at home.”44 Indeed, the 
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pilot of Taking Fire is called, “Band of Brothers,” where the men featured even refer to 
themselves as a “small band of brothers” repeatedly throughout the series, invoking the 
HBO series and the obvious themes of brotherhood and masculinity tied to it. Kyle 
Boucher, JJ McCool, Ken Shriver, Chris Adams and Kyle Petry make up the key players 
within the band, their talking heads appearing in interviews alongside the footage to explain 
specific moments in combat and rehash their time spent on base.  
Yet, the show’s footage drastically diverges from the high production values of 
Band of Brothers and Generation Kill. Thanks to the helmet cameras, the composition of 
Taking Fire shares more similarities with a first-person shooter video game than more 
typical war documentaries. Scenes often feature an assault rifle, perched in the center of 
the screen, surveying the landscape from side-to-side, while the boundaries of the frame 
move in rhythm according to the pace of the soldier, thereby alerting us to the kind of 
motion they are in, whether it be walking, running, or sometimes ducking. Non-diegetic 
elements infiltrate the screen for an even more direct callout to gamer culture - names of 
other soldiers floating over their heads as they too survey the landscape, names of weapons, 
artillery, and vehicles in use appearing in lists on the side of the screen - as if you were a 
player picking your preferred team and your preferred “arsenal.”  
 “It all started when producer Laura Dunne caught sight of a brief clip of action in 
Afghanistan on Funker530.com,” writes a promotional blogpost on Discovery’s website. 
“From there, she was able to get in touch with Kyle ‘Bobby’ Boucher, one of the soldiers 
featured throughout the series, who directed her to other members of his unit who recorded 
action firsthand on the front lines in Afghanistan.”45 When asked in an interview whether 
it was common for people to be filming while on base, Kyle Boucher said it was “pretty 
new at the time. I don’t even think that they had GoPros out yet. I thought it was cool that 
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a couple guys were getting [cameras] because I figured if we get some good stuff on there 
we’ll all be able to share it with each other and have it for the rest of our lives.”46  
The online forum where some of the footage was first found, Funker530, has 
frequently met with controversy due to the violent content it often houses on its platform. 
In essence, the forum encourages service members to upload personal combat footage to 
share and circulate amongst other veterans. Calling itself “The Largest Veteran 
Community,” it first began as a YouTube channel, where some of its videos now boast 
over 37 million hits. It eventually grew large enough to form its own site, foregoing 
YouTube’s community guidelines regarding graphic content. In order to respond to a 
controversy around a video featuring a marine getting shot in the neck, reportedly without 
the knowledge of that particular marine, the founder of Funker530 went on Reddit to 
address the site’s mission and justify the video, writing that “the overall theme of 
FUNKER530 has always been to appeal mostly to the grunts, but we realize that a large 
portion of the community is family members and kids curious about the military. We try 
to keep our content as ‘safe’ as possible, while still keeping it raw.”47  
This sort of uncensored “violence for violence’s sake” showcased on Funker530 is 
present in Taking Fire. In the first episode, a Humvee drives over an IED, immediately 
killing its driver and another soldier inside. We see blood but the bodies themselves are 
blurred. In the next episode, the platoon’s medic takes a bullet in his neck and the back-up 
medic must struggle to stop the bleeding as more bullets continue to fly overhead. Later 
on, a soldier is shot in the shoulder and we see from the camera of his peer trying to stop 
the blood with his hands. The show thus does not shy away from the gore involved in these 
violent encounters. The first-person effect intensifies and arguably revels in the chaos and 
confusion happening on the ground, taking the audience and forcing us to feel as jostled 
and unsettled as the helmet cameras are.  
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Beyond the “raw” violence, over the course of five episodes, we see the small group 
of men attempt to provide protection for local Afghanistan civilians while they build a 
girls’s school (Episode 3, “Flipping the Switch”) and hold a local election (Episode 4, 
“Overwatch”) by providing cover above in the mountain ranges and searching for IEDs in 
the roads. The series then features clips of interviews filmed in 2016 of the men rehashing 
their time there and what it feels like to be home away from their “brothers.” The primary 
focus is the experience of the five men, their reactions to their footage, their memories of 
taking it, and the rare moments of emotion the producers are able to extract from them 
within their retelling. The final episode sees all five meeting up at a bar five years after 
their time in Afghanistan with their wives and children in tow; in something of an 
afterthought, Taking Fire also attempts to highlight issues like PTSD and depression in its 
final episode. However, the rest of the series works to in revel in the chaos of the helmet 
cameras, enclosing the majority of the narrative to moments of high-stakes action while 
building this sense of brotherhood.   
There is a vague understanding of the Taliban, but for the most part enemy 
combatants appear as invisible sources of gunfire within the mountains. Never once on the 
show do we them in the flesh. When we do see others, it is often Afghani children, whose 
faces are blurred, tailing beside the troop’s vehicles, often invoking only brief moments of 
sentimentality. In the final episode, because the troop has experience increased retaliation 
and two deaths, they are ordered to evacuate the base and go home. As they drive through 
neighboring towns in their exit route, local Afghani civilians begin to gather on the road to 
inquire about the fleet of military vehicles moving through their street. Their presence 
causes major concern and anxiety for some the troop members, who have clearly become 
extremely distrustful of civilians throughout their time on base, weary of another Taliban 
attack. One soldier even violently yells at a group of women to “stay the fuck back!” 
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Unfortunately, because Taking Fire’s main concern is with the American soldiers and their 
physical movement on and off the base - its source material entirely dictated by just that - 
it avoids even acknowledging the experience of civilians the soldiers do encounter. We 
don’t get a sense of what the Afghanis want in this scene or whether they are a real source 
of danger for the troop. Their faces are blurred, making their presence in their own town 
feel alien even to the viewer.  
CONCLUSION 
It may be simple enough to disregard Taking Fire as a blip in the deluge of 
Discovery Channel’s current hyper-masculine documentary and reality TV content. But in 
terms of this project, the series serves as an entry point for thinking about that status of the 
combat genre on television throughout the Iraq and Afghanistan War. I understand it as 
contributing to a trend of combat shows that have aired post-9/11 depicting the conflicts in 
the Middle East and as representative of the progressing conflation of the documentary 
form and reality TV. I see this as an important intervention in an ongoing discussion of war 
images and media effects. As Gaines puts it, “images are both distrusted and declared 
harbingers of a brave new world of instantaneity and supra-intelligence.” The Discovery 
Channel in many ways embodies this dichotomy with the move from Mermaids to Taking 
Fire. The helmet footage works to legitimize the channel’s content and distance itself from 
all that is fake, where the only “real” thing are the men on the battlefield.  
While on the surface Taking Fire looks as though we’ve entered into a new realm 
of television, and perhaps we have, its roots are easily defined. It is a combat show whose 
position within Discovery Channel’s programming should be read as an attempt to better 
legitimize its content by appealing to a more masculine and thus more “quality” audience. 
We don’t really learn what it’s like to take fire in Afghanistan nor do we ever learn why 
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some people currently are. What we do learn is that we’re comfortable with a corporation 
using the war in Afghanistan and the depicted deaths of real people as a branding tool.  
Iraq and Afghanistan now exist on our small screens now as a subgenre within the 
category of combat. From what can be gathered by these new shows, the warzones are 
somewhere vaguely in the Middle East. The “real” being portrayed is the combat, in all its 
confusion and disarray, alienated entirely from the intricacies of our actual conflicts. From 
these shows we can see that popular realities have begun to form, in which repeated 
narratives about Iraq and Afghanistan take on something of a life of their own, separated 
from their real subjects, yet existing nonetheless, whether believable or not. What the series 
discussed throughout this chapter largely explain is a persistent desire to further understand 
our contemporary conflicts as missions that (mostly white) American men still suffer, 
endure, and survive on the ground. End stop. Taking Fire highlights and elevates this desire 
through its use of the first-person. Together, their unified silence against other voices and 
other experiences, including those of women and people of color back home and in the 
military, as well as the experience of Iraqi and Afghani civilians, is resounding and 
unfortunately unsurprising. Focusing on these “small bands of brothers” feeds into 
legitimating constructs while simultaneously narrowing the scope of discussion, promising 
to inform and provide new perspectives, these series consistently turn the narrative away 
from questions or discussions about the source of those conflicts.  
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Chapter Two:  Lifetime Fits into the Wartime Schedule: Army Wives 
and All that Melodrama Allows 
 
Woman is faithful (she waits), man is fickle (he sails away, he cruises). It is Woman 
who gives shape to absence, elaborates its fiction, for she has time to do so.  
Roland Barthes, A Lover’s Discourse48 
 
Jeanine Basinger’s analysis of WWII combat genres includes a chapter devoted to 
“variations of genre,” the first of which includes the “women’s film variation.” She writes, 
“In genre terms, the women’s film and the WWII combat film are seemingly diametrically 
opposed to one another.”49 Men in combat films, “even though they are in a war 
environment,” writes Basinger, “are free to move about or, if trapped, to make plans of 
active resistance,” while the protagonists in women’s films are passive, taking their 
“restrictive condition of femininity with them no matter where they go.” Additionally, the 
women’s film is “flexible,” and does not restrict itself to rigid generic identifiers in the 
ways that combat films do, because of their perceived “linkage to real historical events.” 
Thus, we can think of the combat film and the “women’s film,” as Basinger insists on 
calling it, as together forming a kind of genre binarism, where one is informed by the other, 
their definitions and identifiers often understood by their marked difference, usually 
dictated by broader gender norms.  
In terms of war narratives, the “women’s film variation,” typically takes the shape 
of a home-front narrative. And while the combat genre often functions as the more 
dominant visual and cultural vehicle for our perceptions of real wars, very rarely is this 
counterpart considered demonstrative or appropriate for inclusion within any kind of war 
media canon. This is largely because in its typical form, as Basinger has made clear, the 
 45 
“women’s” film or the homefront variation is often coded as feminine, focused not on the 
physical and emotional turmoil of those shipped off,  but on the women and families who 
suffer through a grueling deployment period marked by waiting and absence. Indeed, “the 
defining feature of American war narratives,” writes Susan Jeffords, “is that they are a 
‘man’s story,’ from which women are generally excluded.” Jeffords’The 
Remasculinization of America focuses on popular representations of the Vietnam War 
during the conflict and thereafter in the late seventies and eighties. Her central argument 
that “gender is the matrix through which Vietnam is read” has remained arduously intact 
in the ways that the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts continue to be represented in popular 
media. Here, too, political narratives become redistributed and retold through a 
“reaffirmation of gender,”50 marking foreign and domestic strife as an arena not in which 
the Iraq and Afghanistan civilian experience is contemplated, but wherein the state of the 
U.S. male and American masculinity is placed on center stage.  
This holds true in the combat shows discussed in the previous chapter, where the 
depiction of male soldiers is often portrayed at at odds with their government, their place 
of station, their girlfriends and wives back home, and even at times their own bodies. Rarely 
are the intricacies of these relationships explored or developed in meaningful ways beyond 
the scope of male pain. When the reversal is told, those not directly or intentionally inside 
the scope of combat, it is never taken as seriously. Combat shows, and the critical attention 
paid to them, very much operate on the notion that nothing is in fact as noteworthy or 
significant as a man at war.  
While combat shows like Generation Kill and Off to War have received a fair 
amount of both critical and scholarly attention, this chapter will focus on their historical 
and current counterpart in the homefront genre. Perhaps most significantly, the “women’s 
film” variation “unlike the combat film, cannot be easily identified by one set of generic 
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expectations,” according to Basinger. “After it is identified as being about a woman, it can 
go in many directions.” This can be seen especially in television, where the variation 
narrative is found in forms ranging from the melodrama, the soap opera, and the sitcom, 
taking place both on the home-front and in combat zones. While the premise of combat 
programming inherently contains almost exclusively all-male casts (despite the increased 
presence of women in the military), the “women’s variation” focuses on women affected 
in various ways stateside and abroad: perspectives of mothers, wives, girlfriends, sisters, 
nurses, doctors, newly employed, newly alone, etc. These narratives also typically exist in 
long-form narrative. Combat shows usually appears as limited-run mini-series whereas 
home-front series employ serial strategies, lasting multiple years and seasons.  
 At center stage in this study is Lifetime’s most successful show, Army Wives, which 
lasted a full seven seasons between 2007-2014. At various times within these years, it was 
the only show on television that explicitly dealt with ongoing US conflicts abroad as a main 
backdrop. While given very little critical attention, Army Wives incorporated some 
surprising and relevant topics.  Season One depicted a version of the Pat Tillman case 
where a wife finds out her husband died due to friendly fire rather than the initial reports 
of enemy fire. Another wife attempts to hide a surrogate pregnancy – a very common 
choice among military wives, and a returned soldier with PTSD takes a wife hostage amidst 
a shootout on the military base. I argue Army Wives has worked throughout its seasonal arc 
to address topical matters and must therefore be taken seriously as a home-front variation 
in its efforts to translate the war in a domestic sense.    
I will also examine other war variations leading up to the Lifetime series in order 
to further analyze non-combat formulas and their functions as they have interacted with 
prior US conflicts. The first of these is Major Dad (1989-1993), a CBS sitcom that depicted 
the humorous and sometimes not so humorous scenarios of a single mom marrying a 
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marine during the onslaught of scattered deployments in the mid 90’s. I then look at ABC’s 
quality drama, China Beach (1988-1991), which was one of the “first television programs 
to be set entirely during the Vietnam War in Vietnam,”51 and later syndicated on the 
Lifetime Network. The series focused on a coastal military hospital in a similar fashion to 
M*A*S*H but focused on a group of primarily female nurses stationed there. Both Major 
Dad and China Beach used the masculine constructs of war to showcase interesting female 
leads and counter positions to dominant patriarchal military culture, illustrating a history 
of entertainment television bridging divides between war narratives and strict gender 
norms, while also creating designated formulas in which to construct popular home-front 
narratives of war.  
Ultimately, I aim to use Army Wives and the women’s film variation as an 
intervention into contemporary television scholarship by highlighting their unique 
capabilities to depict the war narratives.  Lauren Rabinowitz has pointed out that daytime 
soaps failed to address topical issues in their time slots during Vietnam and the Gulf War. 
“Soap producers contended that, unlike live sports events like Super Bowl, their schedule 
of taping productions up to six weeks in advance made it difficult to comment directly on 
changing world events,” writes Rabinowitz.52 Lifetime’s decision to create a show 
exclusively about people dealing with the war abroad in its contemporary moment 
represents a major shift within the history of the soap and in television in general. Finally! 
A war so interminable and normalized, it fits into the everydayness and routine a good soap 
requires.  
This chapter will then examine the ways in which Army Wives succeeded as an 
unlikely format to address and engage with our contemporary wars. It will utilize the 
history of the home-front variation on television and the treatment of female audiences and 
“non-quality” TV to explore ways in which the series became highly compatible with the 
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ongoing nature of the war and its capacity to engage a home-front audience as US troops 
remained indefinitely deployed.  
CHINA BEACH (1988), AND MAJOR DAD (1989): A BRIEF HISTORY OF SOAPY WARS 
Major Dad, which aired on CBS from 1989 to 1993, was a sitcom starring Gerald 
McRaney as a new husband and stepdad to a family of four women, who happened to be 
on a fictional marine training base. Wife Polly is a liberal “pro-peace” journalist who 
storms into his office in the first episode to question the major about his pro-military 
beliefs, later writing an anti-war opinion piece disparaging the base and Major MacGillis’s 
job. Somehow, in true sitcom form, the major proposes by the end of the episode. The arc 
of the series is then composed around the arrival of this stern military man as he moves 
into an ultra-feminine home with his new wife and her three daughters. Most episodes deal 
with the cracking away of his rigid routines in place of a more loving and flexible lifestyle. 
Or the flipside occurs where his stern demeanor comes in handy with things like scaring 
off teenage boyfriends and enforcing homework schedules.  
 The series aired for four seasons during what should have been a largely peaceful 
time in American foreign policy. Before the Gulf War, the sitcom dealt with a fictional 
U.S. intervention in Costa Negra where the Major was deployed at the end of one episode 
only to return five minutes into the next. The prospect of combat for the Major and his 
goofy protégé, Lieutenant Gene, is discussed below in a bit where combat is likened to a 
problem a child must work to conceal:   
LIEUTENANT GENE: Wow! My first combat! Wait ‘til I tell my folks. 
MAJOR DAD: Now lieutenant, this is highly secret information. 
LT. GENE: Oh no. 
MAJOR DAD: Problem? 
LT. GENE: I call my mom every Friday night. The woman can tell if I’m hiding 
something just by the tone of my voice. If I haven’t made up my bed, if I’m not 
regular, if I’m about to storm the shores of Costa Negra. 
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The serious implication of military intervention is reduced here and rendered downright 
silly when the lieutenant must deal with keeping it from his mother, aligning it with making 
the bed or an embarrassing physical ailment like intestinal irregularity – things which sons 
must shamefully allow their mothers to oversee and manage. The humor lies in the 
juxtaposition of the domestic and the military inside the same joke, where the mundane 
trials of the lieutenant serve for an inevitable emasculation before he ships out, condensing 
the prospect of military intervention as naïve and innocent while securing his role as goofy 
and loveable despite his future in warfare.  
Major Dad almost exclusively relies on this ‘masculine-as-emasculated’ formula 
throughout its entire run. "We thought: Let's take someone who has trained his whole life 
[to be a fighting man] and put him basically in a desk job," Rick Hawkins, executive 
producer, said of the sitcom before 1990: "We thought we could find a lot of humor in this 
element." This humor eventually had to be put on hold, or at least reworked, when President 
Bush ordered troops to Saudi Arabia in August of 1990, just as Major Dad was about to 
begin its second season. The deployment prompted producers to create multiple script 
changes in order to address the conflict, making Major Dad one of the only fictional 
television shows to directly incorporate an ongoing war. “We have established a certain 
reality with these characters that I think has been accepted by our audience, so we had to 
address it,” Hawkins told the LA Times before Episode 16 of Season Two, “Over Here,” 
aired on CBS on February 4, 1991, in which we find the major contemplating a transfer 
out of his desk job in Virginia to join troops on the ground in Saudi Arabia.53 The episode 
utilized a subtle shift in tone, beginning with a voice-over from the major’s wife, Polly, 
contemplating the effects of the war across the country. But, as Lauren Rabinovitz noted, 
it ended in typical sitcom fashion, using a fight over bedroom space between the youngest 
two daughters to mirror the conflicts abroad and by allowing the Major to stay on base, 
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highlighting the importance of domestic positions within the military. “All right, let’s face 
it: it’s boring, but we are not in the Marine Corps merely for our own personal satisfaction,” 
says the major’s female secretary, Gunner, to dissuade the major from making an order for 
a transfer. “We are here to serve our country, whatever we are called upon to do.” The 
much-anticipated episode ends with the whole family sitting on the living room couch, a 
ripped teddy bear and a dented globe in the hands of the daughters, representative of their 
fight and present ceasefire, and a contented and appreciative major, who ultimately chooses 
the familial and the domestic over the front lines. Rabinovitz understands Major Dad as 
part of a formula and, at times, its own epistemology of wartime culture: 
Television authorized the limits of a discussion not simply through the contents of 
news coverage and political analysis but by structuring the war as a discourse for 
feminine pleasure across programming: it wrapped the war in buttons and bows 
and soap opera woes. For U.S. women, already socially conditioned not to talk or 
be concerned about governmental politics and military maneuvers, the television 
feminization of patriotism serves as a disciplinary effort to eschew open political 
debate and discussion about military and government policies during the Persian 
Gulf War months.54  
By encouraging a passive female voice alongside a sympathetic military institution, 
questions of conflict are recalibrated to fit inside, in some cases, a literal marriage bed, 
establishing an operative discourse that presumes a limited level of engagement. Polly’s 
character exists solely in the home despite working for a newspaper, whereas the major is 
depicted both on the base and back at the house. Her interactions with foreign affairs thus 
consist of the major returning from his desk job followed by a bit of comedic push and pull 
bit where she must extract knowledge from him, usually pertaining to whether or not he 
must leave. Indeed, the main concern of Major Dad’s treatment of the Gulf War surrounds 
the question of the major’s leaving, not why he might have to or for what purpose. Combat 
and U.S. military intervention are reduced to a stagnant, non-debatable construct, the 
inevitable risk of marrying a marine.  
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Impenetrably self-enclosed at times, Major Dad established a gendered, 
domesticated structure of sitcom banter, even as real bombs began dropping over Iraq. Yet 
out of all the soaps and other “women’s TV” of the 90’s, Major Dad was the only program 
to even acknowledge Operation Desert Storm. “No one in All My Children’s Pine Valley 
even seemed to remember that a character had been conveniently written out of the show 
in August when he joined the marines and shipped off to Saudi Arabia” (Rabinovitz 201). 
Indeed, few women’s television shows ever acknowledge any U.S. conflicts, especially 
ongoing ones. The most prominent example of those that did, beyond Major Dad, was 
China Beach, an ABC drama series set place in Vietnam within an American military 
hospital. The show went on air in 1988 and lasted four seasons, before being canceled in 
1991, depicting the war more than a decade after American troops exited the country. Still, 
the series was set in Vietnam amidst the conflict. Its primary focus was on female nurses 
working at the hospital and their day-to-day interactions with American soldiers and 
Vietnamese citizens. The series’ focus on a military hospital echoes M*A*S*H, but takes 
a drastic turn where almost everyone working in the hospital is female as opposed its 
obvious M*A*S*H, with its majority male cast and token female character, Margaret “Hot 
Lips” Houlihan. 
The very first episode of China Beach depicts Dana Delany’s character learning of 
the death of a friend at the hands of a female Vietnamese soldier, only later having to help 
the same woman deliver a baby. The episode ends with Delany’s character allowing the 
woman to escape the hospital, baby in hand, under the cover of night. The series ultimately 
earned acclaim through its unique perspective and catapulted Dana Delany’s career, 
receiving an Emmy for Best Actress both in 1989 and 1992. Vogue wrote of the show at 
the time: 
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The women live in a world without Tampax; they fall into unlikely friendships, 
like fellow countrymen stumbling onto land. They don’t really belong together, 
but they are together. Much of China Beach is shot and lit like a horror movie. 
The show is full of macabre jokes that are supposed to be sophisticated. The 
doctors exhibit an awful lot of M*A*S*H-like elan from behind their blood-
spattered masks. Occasionally, this outre posturing grows tiresome. But what 
makes many scenes silly and excessive is also what makes China Beach great – 
the view. The show is more than a convenient package handed out to the Cagney 
& Lacey crowd. China Beach is the Vietnam War seen by outsiders on the inside, 
by non-combatants, women, who cannot understand, and so must make it all up.55  
Understanding China Beach as a depiction of Vietnam “seen by outsiders on the inside” is 
apt appraisal from the fashion magazine. The reviewer, Cathleen Shine, often takes 
pleasure in its more ridiculous and “macabre” elements while ultimately celebrating its off-
centered positionality, understanding the female “outsider” space as valuable in its own 
sense; she concludes, “what makes many scenes silly and excessive is also what makes 
China Beach great.”  
 China Beach also was symptomatic of particularly apt in relation to “women’s 
television” in terms of its syndication history. Despite its critical appeal, the ratings were 
consistently poor during its initial network run. Lifetime Channel revived the series in 
syndicated reruns after its 1992 cancelation, displaying what Jane Feuer considered to be 
part of Lifetime’s move to “recycle and reposition quality women’s TV of the 1980’s for 
the Lifetime target audience of the 1990s.”56 Feuer understands this programming shift as 
a devaluation and a sanitization of “cutting edge” feminism at the turn of the decade. 
Evoking Raymond Williams, she analyzes Lifetime’s network “flow” and observes: 
During the 1992 rebroadcast of thirtysomething, a promo ran repeatedly that made 
a tongue-in-cheek, point by point comparison between China Beach and L.A. Law 
‘back to back on Lifetime.’ The promo stated that both shows deal with ‘life’s little 
problems.’ The fact that China Beach was a ‘woman’s show’ that dealt with blood, 
war, and death in an often grimly serious manner was lost on Lifetime.  
Here, the nuance and emotional heft of China Beach is repackaged to fit into what many 
scholars have considered to be a particularly kind of non-feminism motif in Lifetime’s 
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promotional agenda. The network that considered itself “television for women” ultimately 
refused to invoke feminist ideals or promises. Therefore, when China Beach earned a 
second life on the channel, its more progressive connotations were re-signified to fit a more 
“convenient” Lifetime package. 
China Beach and Major Dad used the masculine constructs of war to showcase 
interesting female leads and counter positions to dominant patriarchal military culture, 
illustrating a history of entertainment television bridging divides between war narratives 
and strict gender norms. Both garnered space and reworked earlier formulas to construct 
popular and varied war narratives. 
ARMY WIVES AS MILITARY MELODRAMA 
In 2004, ABC launched their soapy hit, Desperate Housewives, featuring Teri 
Hatchet and Felicity Huffman as two suburban mothers with a lot of bad blood. Almost a 
year later, Bravo began its now pervasive reality series format, The Real Housewives. 
Consequently, by the late 2000s, the term “wife,” when it appeared on television, was 
synonymous with drama, triviality, and female hostility. That’s why when Army Wives 
premiered on Lifetime in 2007, it was all the more surprising to find a cast of female 
characters that seemingly only lived to support one another. Its very title, Army Wives, 
played a rather intentional misdirection on audiences expecting the usual “womanly strife” 
and instead actively played against the housewife playbook. The women on this show have 
larger problems than organizing charity events and planning lunch dates, their lives 
consumed instead with the military: awaiting spouses to return from deployments and 
fitting in with the community at large. Most of the women are not wealthy, and in fact are 
much the opposite, usually supporting three too many children with minimal help from 
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government stipends. There’s no money for nannies, hardly enough to buy rounds for one 
another at the local bar.  
The first episode of the series centers around Roxy, played by Sally Peterson, as 
she meets her soon-to-be husband while working as a bartender. She’s a single mother with 
two young sons from two different fathers. In a similar fashion to Major Dad, it takes less 
than a week for a Trevor, a private in the Army, to propose, moving Roxy and her kids to 
the fictional army base in South Carolina where the entirety of the series is set. Trevor’s 
entrance, like the major’s, is staged as a welcome solution to what is framed as an 
incomplete or disjointed family unit. While Roxy is anxious at first upon moving to Fort 
Marshall, where the base causes her to feel temporarily inadequate as an untraditional 
mother, she’s soon comforted by the series’ other major players as they too share similar 
feelings, positing Army life as an untraditional and unnatural lifestyle in and of itself. When 
we meet them, Pamela (Brigid Brannagh), a wife of an elite sniper, has three kids and is 
also pregnant with twins in a planned surrogacy she is hiding from the rest of the base; 
Denise (Catherine Bell) is dealing with the stress of a husband that is currently deployed 
while trying to control violent outbursts from her teenage son; Joan (Wendy Davis) flips 
the script as a lieutenant colonel so her husband, Roland (Sterling K. Brown) takes a role 
in the inner “wife” circle; lastly, Claudia Joy (Kim Delaney) functions as something of a 
matriarch, as her husband is the highest rank of the group and she holds political sway over 
base procedurals.  
The group of women (and Roland) are deeply supportive of one another as they 
attempt to retain a sense of normalcy on base. They constantly babysit for one another on 
a moment’s notice and meet at the local bar in almost every episode. When combat does 
appear, its consequences are pointed at the home rather than a larger geopolitical frame. In 
Season 3, Episode 16, “Shrapnel and Alibis,” Joan has to say goodbye to her newborn baby 
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for a new deployment in Iraq. Upon arriving, in one of the rare instances of actual combat 
depicted on Army Wives, she is involved in an explosion that causes a piece of shrapnel to 
damager her eyes. The tension for the following episodes revolve round whether or not her 
recovery surgery will allow her to see her baby daughter again. She ultimately recovers 
and the violence she experienced is resolved as soon as she sees her child again. In the 
same episode, Pamela has noticed that her husband, who has recently returned from Iraq, 
has intricate burn marks on his shoulders. She suspects he’s been tortured and when she 
confronts him about it, he lies and gaslights her to supposedly avoid sharing any 
confidential information. “You can’t tell the little woman anything because she’s not in the 
big boy’s club!” she ironically asserts in anger. Though Army Wives posits controversial 
topics like torture and Iraqi insurgent groups, the issues, in similar fashion to Major Dad, 
remain enclosed as singular familial events, where Iraq and Afghanistan are not implicated 
in the narrative arc. So while this excludes any exploration of geopolitical strife, Army 
Wives stages the interiority of the women’s lives as of equal significance.    
As mentioned earlier, while on air Army Wives received little of the enthusiastic 
attention television in general was earning in the mid 2000s. Airing at the same time with 
shows like Mad Men and Breaking Bad on premium cable, Army Wives was not a part of 
the third golden age canon and therefore critical reviews were rare. The New York Times 
bothered with a Season Two review back in 2008 but that was the only instance the Times 
ever acknowledged the show’s presence. The AV Club, a website that reviews all kinds of 
media in a way as savvy and self-aware as its geek moniker would suggest, reviewed 
Season Five in 2011, four years after the show debuted. In their TV review column where 
the show finally appeared, AV Club included this disclaimer:  
The Internet has made TV criticism more prominent, but the kinds of shows TV 
critics write about - serialized dramas and single-camera comedies - are rarely the 
kinds of shows that become popular with a mass audience. Every week, AV Club 
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is going to drop in on one of the top-rated programs in the nation, one that we 
don't normally cover. What makes these shows popular? Should we be covering 
them more often? Are our preconceived notions about quality not necessarily 
following popularity justified, or are we jumping to conclusions? This week, Phil 
Nugent checks out one of the top 10 cable shows, Army Wives. Next week, John 
Teti visits cable's second highest rated show, Pawn Stars.57 
The simple fact that they needed a disclaimer to explain and justify the presence of Army 
Wives on their site speaks volumes. Their self-effacing question, “Should we be covering 
them more often?” should be answered, I argue, with a resounding yes. Yet despite their 
preemptive understanding of the lack of attention “non-quality” shows receive as 
potentially unjustifiable, it does not stop the reviewer from completely eviscerating the 
show. The review itself is almost entirely negative, calling Army Wives, “boring,” “all 
clichés,” “less enraging than narcoleptic,” as well as “utterly vacuous,” and “unfelt.”  
The scholarship that does exist around Army Wives is almost exclusively negative. 
Mary Douglas Vavrus writes in 2013 that, “while Army Wives touches weekly on difficult 
subjects, such as injured painkillers addictions and marital infidelity among spouses 
separated by war, it also makes the larger context for these problems glaringly absent.”58 
Indeed, while the show’s characters often express frustration as husbands and partners head 
out for deployment one week and return stoic and uncommunicative the next week, the 
show largely posits an enduring, if sometimes frustrated, uncritical sense of patriotism. Iraq 
and Afghanistan are treated interchangeably as vague deployment points that constantly 
need to be “dealt with” for the sake of our safety but are rarely mentioned in any detail or 
nuance regarding even the missions and types of solders being sent, let alone the issues at 
stake in the regions. As time passes we don’t get a sense that the women are frustrated with 
the US military policies but rather are exasperated by the ongoing and ceaseless nature of 
it, often having to come to terms with the many conflicts abroad as a “necessary evil.” And 
while Joan and Roland are played by black actors, the series asserts a generally 
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heteronormative white middle-class society, despite the historical diversity of the military. 
Scholar Liora Elias has written about Army Wives’ take on the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell” and its homonormative illustration of a happy lesbian couple, content with their 
placement and newly found, magically acquired equality on the base.59 
The series, on the surface, depicts an ultimately pro-war and pro-American 
narrative of  military operations despite the increasingly negative opinion many Americans 
may have about US involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. While Vavrus qualifies that 
Lifetime’s predominantly female audience “should not be underestimated.” She argues that 
Army Wives “deploys the device of marriage to frame the military missions in Iraq and 
Afghanistan so as to encourage acquiescence to these missions’ continually shifting ends.” 
The OED defines “acquiescence” as a “passive assent to, or compliance with, proposals or 
measures; acceptance of something undesirable.” In her extensive analysis of Army Wives, 
Vavrus illustrates the implicit messages present within the show’s understanding of war; 
however, she does very little to counteract these points with the multitude of readings 
possible from the “predominantly female” audience. Her criticisms ultimately echo those 
of soap operas throughout the ‘80s and ‘90s whose female audiences were consistently 
thought of as mindless and passive, or in the AV Club’s word, “narcoleptic.” 
Has Army Wives fallen victim to those clichéd tropes of soap audiences of 
yesteryear? In her book, Screen Tastes: Soap Opera to Satellite Dishes, Charlotte Brunsdon 
compiles a list of blurbs criticizing audiences for the popular British soap, Crossroads. 
“These were the ones with the worst symptoms of withdrawal pains,” writes Hillary 
Kingley of Crossroads fans in Sunday People in 1979. “For them this four times a week 
shot of soap opera had become as habit forming as a drug.” Later, Peter McKay wrote of 
Crossroads in Evening Standard, “People who become addicted to a serial as bad as 
Crossroads are people who would not fight for a seat on the bus.” Both reviews - or rather, 
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insults - illustrate fans of soaps as diseased in some way from whom Crossroads was an 
addiction. Additionally, similar to those with actual addictions, fans are accused of lacking 
some form of moral strength or will of character. Reviews of soaps, or soap-like shows 
echo and encapsulate the outdated embrace of media effects arguments, where audiences 
are purely passive and television is invasive in every sense.60  
It’s important to note that Army Wives promotes itself as a primetime drama. It also 
directly positions itself in opposition with other television wives,  attempting to achieve 
more legitimacy than a daytime soap, utilizing, as the AV Club also noted, subtle acting 
techniques and more subdued plotlines in place of more overt and identifiable melodrama. 
Its distinction also includes its depiction of issues in the military rather than with other 
women, intentionally avoiding female villain characters as a way to avoid soapy 
classifications.  
Yet I argue that Army Wives is indeed a version of a primetime soap. In her essay, 
“The Search for Tomorrow in Today’s Soap Operas,” Tania Modleski refers to Laura 
Mulvey’s idea that spectatorship involves identifying with main male protagonist, 
“resulting in the spectator becoming the ‘representative of power.’” Modleski asserts that 
soaps dismantle this placement of power:  
Instead of giving us ‘one powerful ideal ego…who can make things happen and 
control events better than the subject/spectator can,’ soaps present us with 
numerous limited egos, each in conflict with one another and continually thwarted 
in its attempts to ‘control events’ because of the inadequate knowledge of other 
peoples’ plans, motivations, and schemes.61  
In the case of Army Wives, there are “numerous limited egos” amongst the wives 
themselves, but the conflict primarily derives from the military, whose policies and sudden 
decisions are a constant source of tension, agony at times, confusion, and ongoing concern 
for the women. Therefore, in many ways, the military takes the place of the villain female 
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nemesis, asserting power and ‘controlling events’ within the women’s lives, allowing 
viewers to feel the “feminine powerlessness” pervasive in traditional soaps.  
Particularly with its slow-paced ‘three steps forward, two steps back’ formula and 
its general attempt to portray housewives, Army Wives undoubtedly functions in many 
ways like a soap opera. I work to make this classification clear because if we understand 
our television programming as viewed in gendered ways, understanding Army Wives as a 
soap allows us to frame this series as part of long run of women’s television programming 
too often swept under the rug as mindlessly dangerous for viewers.  
Additionally, scholars like Elana Levine and Michael Newman have noted that the 
soap’s most essential quality, seriality, has been adopted by more masculine primetime 
dramas and heralded as “quality” television in the post-network era. Never prestige but 
always the grunt, the soap’s lack of inclusion within this new category despite its dedication 
to seriality can be blamed on what Levine and Newman call the “essential ending” where 
“the widely held assumption that soaps feature never-ending stories, with complications 
spinning off from even the resolutions that do occur” causes the narrative trajectory to read 
as feminine, whereas in primetime seriality, “we see a repeated valuation of the serialized 
narrative that successfully concludes.”62 An outlier among the mini-series and short docu-
dramas that have been included within the sphere of “quality” amongst war related shows, 
Army Wives does not give us a tidy ending. Soldiers that do return are expected to pack up 
and leave again soon and wives learn to cope.  The show ultimately illustrates a kind of 
endless relay, a constant burden with no end in sight, leaving many of its plot lines 
unresolved in its seventh and final season. In an interview with The New York Post, the 
executive producer, Jeff Melvoin joked about the series finale, “We didn’t last quite as 
long as the war had, but we came pretty close.”63 
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WATCHING THE WIVES 
To return to Vavrus’s understanding of Army Wives as a show that encourages an 
“acquiescence” to military operations, how then can we understand the implications of the 
series without subscribing to gendered stereotypes of soap audiences? As previously 
established multiple times within this project, audiences have awareness to political 
paratexts of television as well as genre codes. Is there a way to understand fans of Army 
Wives without accusing them of some kind of passive complicity with the US military? 
In Reading the Romance, Janice Radway attempts to tackle a similar question 
regarding 80s mass-market romance novels. Similar in some ways to David Morley’s 
account of BBC’s Nationwide’s reception across different groups of people, Radway is 
interested in class and gender roles within society as she challenges pervasive notion that 
female fans of romance fiction must be taking part in some anti-feminist and uneducated 
pursuit, given the rather traditional agenda of the texts themselves. In order to analyze the 
allure of the romance novels, she separates the act of reading from the text itself, and in 
doing so highlights ways in which women use reading as an escape from their daily lives, 
further complicating the “hypodermic needle” theory by placing agency within the act of 
approaching a text rather than the text itself. She writes in her updated introduction that she 
“attempts a parallel look at the conditions organizing women’s private lives and that 
likewise contribute to the possibility of regular romance reading.”64 In an effort to 
understand why certain women are driven to such traditional and arguably oppressive texts, 
Radway points to other factors within a woman’s life that contribute to her decisions and 
her own understanding of leisure and in doing so makes space for provocation and 
subversion of daily life within the very act of reading romance fiction.  
It is this space for provocation that I would like to leave open and available in the 
case of Army Wives. What elements of the series provide qualities of escape and relief for 
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viewers, both in and out of the military? To what extent does it allow for fantasies to be 
curated among fans? Particularly those that might imagine a world where a looming never-
ending war is a reality better fit for the fictional world of a soap opera rather than real life? 
In this section, I examine the responses on an online messaging board reacting to the series 
and take a cue from Janice Radway in order to problematize the notion that fans of Army 
Wives must be exercising a conservative, misinformed agenda. Instead I aim to uncover 
reasons why veterans and military spouses themselves tune in despite its glaring 
inaccuracies. 
A survey was taken in March 2011 on the military forum “Military SOS” or 
“Military Significant Other Support”65 asking if members think Army Wives is a realistic 
view of spouses’ lives. The forum advertised itself as “a support site for military spouses 
and significant others, open to all loved ones of military service members (active, reserve 
and retired).” On it could be found tips for long-distance relationships, ways to volunteer 
for military family advocacy programs, and even posts about getting through a divorce. 
The Army Wives thread spawned 79 votes, and of the 79 that answered, 68 voted “NO.” 
Despite this overwhelming majority, 42 members commented on the forum to further 
express their opinions on the show. Examing the responses on the messaging board reacting 
to the series and take a cue from Janice Radway’s Reading the Romance, we might 
problematize the notion that fans of Army Wives must be exercising a conservative, 
misinformed agenda. In so doing, we may also uncover reasons why veterans and military 
spouses themselves tune in to the series despite its glaring inaccuracies.   
In response to the question, “Do you think the Army Wives tv show is a realistic 
view of military spouse’s lives?” many commented with things like “not even remotely 
close,” or “I wish.” One member, mel524, wrote, “No, I don't think it's a true 
representation. However, considering most live the military life, why would we watch a 
 62 
‘reality’ version of the show? It's supposed to be entertainment - so they're obviously going 
to add extra drama and other aspects that may be more of a stretch from reality.” This 
sentiment was shared by many others who viewed Army Wives as strictly escapist, a series 
that was purposefully devoid of realistic depictions and accurate information. One 
responder, Bluebutterfly505, contended that she’d be “in a strait jacket by now,” if her life 
was filled with “that much constant drama.” Similar to Shine’s take on China Beach, 
viewers on the messaging board express a kind of perverse sense of joy in the more absurd 
moments of the show. For others, enough was enough:  
I watched one season, and although some of the emotions that they feel/express 
seem somewhat right, I feel like the overall situations are not normal lifestyles at 
all. Too many people think that is way military life is like. HAH! If you think the 
average military family lives in a GIANT house with that much disposable 
income, never moving, being that friendly with all the wives on base, etc. they got 
another thing coming.   
-TickleMahPickle, One Man Wolf Pack 
This person clearly couldn’t make it past the first season, finding the inaccuracies of 
military life too hard to watch. He/she thinks the portrayal of military spouses is too nice; 
suggesting most wives are not friends with everyone. Many others also expressed 
frustration that no family on Army Wives is asked to relocate. It is not uncommon for real 
military families to have to move every six months to a year, yet hardly anyone is asked to 
move in the series; nor does it ever seem to be a cause for worry.  
I always swear I'm going to stop watching because it's so ridiculous, but then I 
realize they're trying to cram in the entire military/Army experience into a really 
small group of women. That, and it's a soap opera. 
-AG815, Senior Member 
Here AG815 justifies watching the show by understanding it as a soap opera. This allows 
them to account for the “ridiculous”-ness and overlook its poor attempts at illustrating the 
military.  
My DB who grew up on military bases and is enlisting soon always complains 
about the details of things, like the decorations on the uniforms of the soldiers 
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who informed Denise of her son's death last episode. He also says it's pretty 
accurate with the portrayals of infidelity. I usually roll my eyes when he mentions 
that part of it. I honestly have been watching the show pretty regularly since the 
first season and I didn't and don't watch it for the accurate portrayal; I watch it for 
the story and for the entertainment. If it was an accurate portrayal would it really 
be exciting enough to even be a good show? 
-11MikesGirl21,  
This real military wife airs her frustrations with her husband’s complaints about the show 
and implies her actual life wouldn’t be entertaining enough for a television series. Her 
husband’s assertion that some of the marital infidelity that takes place on the show is in 
fact accurate reads like a veiled threat from her perspective and illustrates an interesting 
tension between the official military reality and the domestic reality on the show. 
 Several other posts were persistent in detailing the ways in which the show fails to 
include small details about ranks or misunderstands the social intricacies in general military 
communities. Claudia Joy’s husband on the show is a commander, for example, and the 
fact that she befriends so many lower ranking families, frustrated several members on the 
forum. “Maybe I'm wrong, but most people don't personally know a general or the garrison 
commander and hang out with them on the weekends…at least, I know we sure don't,” 
joked Nicole. One member commented on the rapid promotion of Pamela’s newlywed 
Trevor who only recently enlisted when the series begins: 
Wasn't he only an 05 when they met? (two star in the Navy is rear admiral upper 
half), I watched it off and on the 1st season. I think it's pretty off....but so is NCIS, 
JAG, etc. 
-Beach, Senior Member 
This user makes an intriguing comparison to other military dramas, outlining a general low 
standard for television to accurately portray the military overall and implying that their 
expectations for the show’s accuracy are partially informed by what else is going on in 
television. 
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While this small forum post is by no means comprehensive of the entire Army Wives 
audience, it provides interesting glimpse of responses from the military community, with 
posts by fans of the series and those who watched a few episodes. Their critiques 
overwhelmingly let us know that expectations are not high for Army Wives to provide an 
accurate representation of war and contemporary military life yet the series’ unrealistic 
quality did not prevent some forum members from becoming big fans of the show, asserting 
they’d rather see more drama and entertainment on their television screens than the 
supposedly dull reality of their actual home lives. Even military experts were happy in 
some cases to overlook Army Wives’ inaccuracies, understanding and enjoying them 
instead as customary in military-based television.  
CONCLUSION 
I acknowledge that for many reasons it is impossible to pinpoint the exact cultural 
implications of the feminine format of the soap as it relates to the masculine genre of war. 
But I hope that an interrogation of this trend will shed light on attitudes regarding the war 
in Iraq and Afghanistan and will rectify trends in television scholarship that ignore 
programs like Army Wives. 
The final episode of Season 1 of Army Wives entails a male soldier sporting a 
suicide vest to the base’s local bar, where all our favorite wives routinely gather. He is not 
there in the name of Islam – in stark contrast to the former POW character, Brody, in the 
season finale of Homeland a few years later. Nor is he there to teach the American military 
a lesson, which also would require Army Wives to address the larger political context. 
Instead, the only place Army Wives can place its gaze is inwards. The soldier sporting the 
vest is there for his wife, who after opening up to her fellow female spouses about the 
domestic abuse she’d been suffering at the hands of her husband, has recently been 
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empowered enough to leave the man for someone new. Therefore, the suicide vest does 
not invoke some vague threat from the Middle East as expect, in fact we’re not even sure 
if the husband in question has ever been overseas. Instead, it’s there to remind us of the 
underlying homegrown terrorism that is toxic masculinity. The husband successfully 
triggers the vest, killing himself along with Claudia Joy’s eldest daughter, as well as the 
bartender - the ultimate female comrade of the wives on base. The most violent incident 
then that takes place on Army Wives occurs at the hands of a disgruntled husband, 
suggesting that domestic life for these women can be as big a threat, if not bigger, than 
whatever war is going on elsewhere.  
The characters on Army Wives are then trapped in what Lynne Joyrich, in an essay 
on soap operas, calls “an indefinitely expandable middle, lacking in beginning middle or 
end.”  This expandable middle offers no resolutions, does not posit any responsibilities in 
historicizing, but continues onward in an “eternally conflictual present.” Such is the world 
of our army wives as they live and breathe on both a home and a military base in which 
unexpected deployments are learned to be inevitable as years run on. Its unwillingness to 
inquire beyond the scope of the base alongside its constant invocation of a United States at 
war work to illustrate Joyrich’s 1988 piece on “what melodrama can allow”: 
 
 
 
Melodrama helps us place ourselves in a confusing world – its insistence on the 
validity of moral or experiential truths and its faiths in the reality of the stakes 
creates a space from which to act. The ‘naiveté’ associated with a feminized 
spectator may in fact reflect melodrama’s suspicion of linguistic and cultural 
codes, a suspicion that now well-founded in today’s loud of mobile signs and 
codes. While melodrama –and its female viewers – have been seen as suspect, 
there is something offered in this stance. Melodrama’s promise of universally 
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legible meaning seems particularly compelling in the postmodern era, experienced 
by many as desperately in need of some kind of grounding. 66 
It is precisely its a-historicity and unwillingness to make hard conclusions or moral 
statements that makes Army Wives so significant. Removed from the combat genre that is 
so entrenched in moral capital and image-making, the series’ “universally legible 
meanings” showcases something of a relief. Similar to ways in which China Beach, 
according to 1988 Vogue, is “the Vietnam War seen by outsiders on the inside, by non-
combatants, women, who cannot understand, and so must make it all up,” Army Wives is 
Iraq and Afghanistan seen by those entirely outside of its scope. What gets “made up” is 
perhaps the most telling; what is being said in female absence is perhaps as loud and 
resounding as the bullets zooming by on HBO. 
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Chapter Three: So Proudly She Hails: Combat, Melodrama, and 
Homeland 
 On October 11, 2015, Showtime’s CIA drama, Homeland, aired the second episode 
of its fifth season. The episode, entitled, “The Tradition of Hospitality,” follows the 
protagonist of the series, Carrie Mathison (Claire Danes) as she travels to the 
Syrian/Lebanese border. Carrie is a CIA analyst with bipolar disorder, though she is on a 
“break” from the agency in this season. She is there instead to gain assets in order to prevent 
a potential Hezbollah attack on a refugee camp on behalf of the non-profit organization 
that funds the camp. The episode involves a suicide bomber, a massive explosion, and a 
Russian spy getting cozy with Saul Berenson (Mandy Patinkin, who is CIA chief at this 
point in the series). Yet even amongst these unexpected occurrences, what makes this 
episode stand out, in a series otherwise filled with bombings and spies, is a subtle set detail. 
In the beginning of the episode, Carrie walks through the camp and we briefly see Arabic 
graffiti on the walls of battered homes and buildings. An Arabic reader would be able to 
decipher the words “Homeland is racist” sprayed onto them.  
The self-proclaimed “Arabian Street Artists,” Heba Amin, Caram Kapp, and Don 
Karl were all hired by Showtime to create “pro-Assad” graffiti for the series. With no 
Arabic speakers staffed on the production of Homeland, a show that had depicted several 
Arab characters and countries up to that point, no one caught the message before the final 
cut went to air. “For four seasons, and entering its fifth, Homeland has maintained the 
dichotomy of the photogenic, mainly white, mostly American protector versus the evil and 
backwards Muslim threat,” the artists stated in a blog post, calling the show racist for its 
“inaccurate, undifferentiated and highly biased depiction of Arabs, Pakistanis, and 
Afghans, as well as its gross misrepresentations of the cities of Beirut, Islamabad- and the 
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so-called Muslim world in general.” They also snuck in other messages in the episode like, 
“There is no Homeland,” and “This show does not represent the views of the artists.”  
While the very success of the protest would suggest the show was in fact proven to 
be racist, or at least lazy, it did very little to affect its viewership. In fact, throughout its 
run, starting with its 2011 debut, Homeland has produced divisive conversations amidst 
significant and loyal fandom. In 2013, The Guardian wrote that the series “isn’t just bad 
TV, it peddles the worst lies about US foreign policy.” Hitting a similar note, a 2014 
Washington Post review called Homeland “the most bigoted show on television.”67 Yet 
despite very heated backlash from some prestigious media outlets, Homeland has built a 
large following. Perhaps most significant, in a bizarre illustration of Neil Postman’s 
“amusing ourselves to death,” President Barack Obama called it “one of his favorite 
shows” in a profile for People magazine back in 2011.68 Since then it was reported that 
actor Damian Lewis, who plays Agent Nicholas Brody, even sent the president a signed 
DVD boxset, writing “From one Muslim to another,” in a display of fictional worlds 
colliding with the political worlds they set out to depict. Lewis is not himself Muslim but 
his character, Brody, converts to Islam on the show. The joke is meant to make light of the 
racist and Islamophobic far-right conspiracy theories that Obama must secretly be Muslim, 
if not also working for Al Qaeda, like Brody’s character is.69 
Most notably, Stephen Colbert, a self-proclaimed fan of the series, responded 
directly to the graffiti artists’ message on a segment of The Late Show with Stephen 
Colbert: 
“It might not accurately portray Muslims. But that doesn’t make it racist. Because 
the show doesn’t accurately portray anything. Take Carrie. You really think that 
bipolar disorder is all about solving international conspiracies to the sounds of jazz? 
No! It’s mostly feeling so depressed all day that you end up binge-watching 
Homeland….Don’t get me started on remotely detonating the vice-president’s 
pacemaker – that’s not a thing!... So graffiti men, if you’re upset the show is full of 
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Arab characters trying to double cross everyone, maybe you shouldn’t have double 
crossed everyone with these Arabic characters.”  
The tirade ultimately culminates in an ardent defense of the show, where ludicrous plot 
points - like the assassination of the vice president by way of “hacking” into his pacemaker 
device in season two – undercut our expectation for the show to be realistic in other aspects.  
He justifies the inaccuracies of Muslim representation by throwing it in with inaccuracies 
that have always been implicit within high-stakes drama series, mixing them all in the same 
grab bag of trivial television constructs, essentially saying, “It’s far-fetched already, so why 
does it matter?” In Colbert’s defense of Homeland, the functionality of a pacemaker and 
the morality of the Muslim population as a whole are rendered interchangeable.  
My point here is to illustrate the strident, often tense ways in which audiences have 
reacted to Homeland, which has been both championed and despised since its debut. No 
matter where you fall, it is hard to deny that the allure of Carrie Mathison, Saul Berenson, 
and their wide-ranging pursuits is potent and at times, inflammatory. Homeland took home 
“Best Drama Series” at both the Emmys and the Golden Globes in 2011, its first season, 
while Claire Danes won an Emmy and a Golden Globe for “Best Actress in a Drama.” She 
win again for both award shows in 2012. Still going strong and slated for eight seasons, the 
peerless Homeland has become one of the most successful, critically acclaimed dramas on 
television – a series that dramatizes the war on terror and ongoing conflicts in places 
ranging from the Middle East to Europe to the U.S.  
Unlike other series discussed in this study, Homeland has been written about 
extensively in both academia and popular media outlets. An entire issue of Cinema Journal 
showcased the show in 2015 and just recently, The Los Angeles Review of Books featured 
a piece on the series entitled, “Is Homeland Still Racist?”70 Instead of focusing on 
Homeland’s politics or ever-changing paranoias, as others have done, I will attempt to 
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answer why we ask so much of Homeland to begin with. To refer back to Colbert, “the 
show doesn’t accurately portray anything,” yet scholars like James Castonguay have 
argued that Homeland “successfully exploits post-9/11 insecurities, psychological trauma, 
and narrative complexity to produce ‘quality’ television propaganda for the Obama 
administration.”71 On the one hand, the show is explicitly inaccurate, according to Colbert, 
yet on the other, it functions as “successful” propaganda. How do we account for this 
discrepancy? 
 By presenting Carrie Mathison as the ultimate spy heroine in our post-9/ll society, 
Homeland intentionally inserts soapy qualities and into what is otherwise a counter-
terrorism thriller. I argue that the dichotomy embodies a fissure in reception caused by this 
unique blend of generic identifiers, where Homeland is both a combat show and a 
homefront show. Given that the traditional male dominated combat form typically denotes 
“quality” and is often perceived as a way to “learn” about wars whereas the “women’s” 
home-front variation is defined by its very absence from these male spaces, connotative 
instead of hyperbole and melodrama, Homeland occupies an ambiguous middle ground. 
The following will analyze the ways in which Homeland insists on gendering the 
negotiations of fictionalized foreign and domestic affairs, much of which is literally and 
figuratively embedded in the character and body of Carrie Mathison. I argue that the series 
illustrates ways in which popular war narratives inevitably fall back on traditional gender 
borders in order to understand American conflicts despite the increasingly changing nature 
of warfare and our growing expectation regarding what television can do.   
WOMEN IN COMBAT 
In her discussion of combat genre variations, Jeanine Basinger examines the rather 
rare occurrence of “women in combat” films during WWII. After a close examination of 
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So Proudly We Hail (1943), Cry Havoc (1943), and several postwar films like Skirts Ahoy! 
(1952) and Flight Nurse (1953), Basinger notes that the depiction of women on the 
frontline functions as a telling “merger” between combat films and “women’s” films. She 
argues: 
Using established generic conventions to reflect new issues is a part of the 
evolutionary process. As the evolution takes place over a period of years, it is to be 
expected that the issues must shift. However, it is not as expected that within the 
evolution, an incompatible genre like the woman’s film might comfortably bond 
with it. The fact that it can happen helps explain genre. The woman’s combat film 
– the merger of two opposite genres - clarifies the existence and concerns of both, 
and also proves that both genres exist in audience’s minds.72 
The films illustrate an intentional maneuvering of standard genre codes, where the 
woman doing the “man’s job” is the designated plot point, or the “big surprise,” as Basinger 
writes, which everything else in each film centers around and responds to. The women 
being women in combat is the issue at hand, rather than the combat itself. The intentionality 
of this gender reversal works to bolster the existence of the genres it combines, highlighting 
“women in combat” as something of an inherent misplacement. And despite being in 
combat zones, Basinger argues that the female characters are ultimately faced with the 
same restrictions and tensions found in women’s films, where they must inevitably make 
self-effacing decisions, unable to have what men can have. In So Proudly We Hail, a 
combat nurse weds a male soldier against the advice of her female commander, forgoing 
her military duties by “giving in” to her femininity and “falling in love.” Her husband 
ultimately dies in combat and she is left in a state of depression, only able to recover upon 
returning home. Basinger posits, “If she leaves the combat zone (the man’s world), she can 
live again in her rightful place, the woman’s world. Thus, the film offers liberation and 
says be true to it, and simultaneously punishes it and says it will kill you.” The “women in 
combat” variation, then, embodies an interesting dilemma. While it works to highlight the 
exclusivity of “a man’s world,” perhaps even interrogates it in certain instances, it must 
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also be defined through its own restrictiveness, reverting to melodrama when women reach 
where they cannot venture.   
Basinger’s brief survey of the small handful of WWII films mentioned above is 
dwarfed by her exhaustive examination of over one hundred WWII male-dominated 
combat films, beginning with A Yank on the Burma Road (January 1942) and ending with 
The Final Countdown (July, 1980). Rare as it was during and after WWII, the women-in- 
combat variation remains an infrequent and sparsely deployed formula across film and 
television even today. The few examples that come to mind are Private Benjamin (1980), 
a comedy starring Goldie Hawn, She’s in the Army Now (1981), an ABC made-for-
television movie starring Jamie Lee Curtis, G.I. Jane (1997), a Ridley Scott action film 
starring Demi Moore, and Cadet Kelly (2002), a coming-of-age Disney movie starring 
Hillary Duff.2 As evident by their very titles - where female names and pronouns are 
juxtaposed with military titles - the gender reversal remains the key element at play even 
within these more contemporary films. Additionally, with the exception of G.I. Jane, the 
films are largely comedic, working off gendered stereotypes in light, playful ways. For 
instance, Goldie Hawn plays a spoiled gold-digger in Private Benjamin who must join the 
army for financial reasons after her wealthy fiancé dies just before their wedding. The 
success of the film led to a CBS sitcom of the same name (starring Lorna Patterson as 
Private Judy Benjamin) that aired for three seasons (1981-1983) over thirty-nine half-hour 
episodes. The films are also primarily training films that take place in neutral spaces outside 
of warzones. The daily struggles are then not combat but the demands of military life, 
usually exemplified through the domineering gaze of an onerous drill sergeant. Only G.I. 
                                                
2 While there are many films and television series that depict women in fictional and/ or 
fantastical battle sequences like Game of Thrones, Wonder Woman, etc., I limit my scope to US 
military narratives for the purposes of examining the entertainment industry as it relates to the 
depiction of contemporary conflicts.  
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Jane deals with combat when an emergency mission unravels in Libya at the end of the 
film. Despite being temporarily removed from her duties for false (and homophobic) 
accusations of fraternizing with women, Moore’s character must prove herself by saving 
the day and the life of her commanding officer, who earlier in the film had subjected her 
to a tortuous training regiment. “Whether it’s a melodrama or a light comedy, a woman’s 
film always forces a woman to make a choice. If she makes the wrong one, she is punished 
for it. Thus, the woman’s film demonstrates society’s way of repressing women. Force the 
choice of tradition on her, and punish her if she chooses anything else.” 
As the sparsity of these texts illustrate, rarely are women depicted in dramatic 
television or film in actual combat. When they are, their gender remains the notable element 
in play. All of these factors are perhaps what makes Showtime’s Homeland such a complex 
television series. Her gender and her bipolar disorder consistently mark Carrie’s status 
throughout the series as “other” in relation to her male peers. Saul Berenson takes on a 
strange paternal role in the series, always playing her superior throughout despite no often 
times being two steps behind Carrie in their next mission. Whether or not Carrie’s most 
recent hunch is accurate is usually purveyed through Saul’s reaction to it, who often pushes 
and pulls Carrie to and from the CIA depending on how trustworthy he finds her to be in 
any given season. Additionally, the title, Homeland, positions notions of national security 
alongside the domestic, where “home” can refer to a number of things, ranging from 
Carrie’s own domestic space to the attitudes of the nation at large. Homeland also at times 
reads like a play on the term (and idea of) “motherland,” especially when Carrie must 
juggle her role as the mother of her (and Brody’s) daughter, Franny, despite the ever-
increasing stress and trauma her work life entails.  
 Other television scholars have done well to point to out ways in which Homeland 
has adopted traditional crime drama formulas, replacing more typical dealings with 
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homicides and robberies with terrorism plots. Before Homeland even hit the scene, scholar 
Yvonne Tasker coined the term, “terror TV,” referring to shows like Law & Order (1990 -
2010) and NCIS: Los Angeles (2009) where “themes of national security and the necessity 
of combating terror” have been transposed from more action based mediums to more 
formulaic crime television scenarios. Here, combating terror and the “unpalatable 
techniques” used in such programs, according to Tasker, are “effectively normalized,” with 
American audiences gettin used to the idea of extreme US intelligence strategies as they 
are dramatized with exceeding severity every week.73 Fox’s 24 (2001-2010), which was in 
production before the attacks on September 11th and began airing just two months after, is 
often considered the centerpiece for this shift where Jack Bauer becomes a TV version of 
Bruce Willis in Die Hard that is reinvigorated weekly to deal with a new and dire counter-
terrorism pursuit, taking a spot as consistent and pervasive as the weekly trials in something 
like Law and Order.  
By the time Homeland arrived in 2011, persistent and convoluted fictional terror 
plots were nothing new for television. Yet because of its Showtime “quality” connotation, 
many have imbued the text with what Tasker calls a “symbolic dichotomy between the 
Bush administration’s 24 and Obama’s Homeland,” where Homeland’s new narrative 
complexities, are seen as illustrative of a “profound shift” in television crime dramas and 
perhaps more significantly, American perceptions of terror.74 While I don’t disagree that 
Homeland contains depictions of CIA operations that promote an urgent need for 
“unpalatable techniques” against deeply dramatized and convoluted understandings of 
terror, for this project I am more interested in examining the unusual site of the series within 
television genres, understanding Carrie as something of the female Jack Bauer. Indeed, 
engaging in “terror TV” and crime drama/ spy thriller formulas, Homeland also equally 
makes use of the home-front genre and utilizes distinctive soap opera “woes,” recalling 
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Rabinovitz’s term to create an interesting combination of the qualities and expectations 
from both “masculine” and “feminine” genre forms. I understand Carrie’s role as a female 
intelligence analyst to be the most defining marker of the show, what everyone else 
responds to and everything centers around. The following section is a close analysis of the 
series as it relates to its female lead.  
CARRIE AS ABJECT HEROINE: “IT’S MY JOB. IT WILL ALWAYS BE MY JOB! DON’T YOU 
GET THAT?!”3 
 
 
Figure 1: Carrie’s crying face.  
Throughout its arc, Homeland sends Carrie on an array of missions. At the start of 
the show, she has recently been removed as a station agent in Iraq and effectively grounded 
in the US after overstepping her duties abroad. Upon her return to the states, she is 
convinced that a returned POW, Brody (Damian Lewis), is planning an attack on the US 
with Al Qaeda. She ultimately falls in love with Brody, after watching him through illegal 
                                                
3 From Episode 9, “Crossfire,” where Carrie is catatonic in her bed after being fired from the CIA. 
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surveillance, despite being right about her suspicions. The first three seasons of the show 
are then focused on Brody’s interactions with his wife and children as he becomes further 
entangled with Carrie’s world and her negotiations with Al Qaeda, working as a double 
agent and eventually dying in a public hanging in Iran in the season three finale. After 
Brody’s death, Homeland’s seasonal arcs become much more enclosed, taking on a new 
location and new problem each year. In season four, Carrie is a station agent in Kabul, 
despite having recently given birth to Brody’s child, Franny. There she is responsible for a 
drone strike resulting in civilian deaths and must deal with the aftermath of the following 
insurgency. In season five, she is in Berlin with her daughter in tow. Having tired of her 
drone days, she now works for a non-profit. However, she is still the center of major 
geopolitical strife and must ultimately stop a Sarin gas attack from hitting the Berlin 
subway system. In season six, she is back stateside, this time in Brooklyn, working for an 
organization that provides resources for Muslim immigrants in the US. By the end of this 
season, she foils an assassination attempt on the first female president. Season seven, 
(recently concluded at the time of this writing) finds Carrie back in D.C. where she is 
unemployed and living with her sister. Her obsessive suspicions about the president’s 
authoritative actions cause her sister to sue for custody of her daughter. The loss of Franny 
allows Carrie back into the hands of Saul and the CIA once again in order to unearth a 
Russian plan to disrupt the US government. Carrie’s finds herself in the middle of every 
major geopolitical crisis every season, no matter where she is stationed. Her bipolar 
disorder is often depicted as having both facilitating her peculiar genius for solving 
complex plots and continually debilitating her capacity to act, where her manic-ness 
sometimes works in her favor while other times works against her. Thus, her mental 
stability, wrapped up in her ability to assess and prevent terrorism, alongside her role as a 
mother – is constantly in flux throughout the show.   
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The first three seasons of Homeland now appear to be almost a substantially 
different show from the one airing in subsequent seasons because it was so deeply 
entrenched within Carrie and Brody’s tumultuous relationship. It used the story of a 
returned POW as a foundational tool in which to ponder questions of nationhood and 
ultimately familial loyalty, both in many ways being defined by the other at once as the 
nation state is represented and negotiated through the individual family unit. In season one, 
Brody’s return, after being held captive in Iraq for eight years, is immediately questioned 
by Carrie, who suspects he has been “turned” by his captor – the terrorist mastermind and 
main “villain” Abu Nassir - and she sets up surveillance without clearance from the CIA 
within the Brody home to keep an eye on him without clearance from the CIA.  
Much of the first half of the season depicts Carrie watching screens set up on her 
living room coffee table that display the interiority of the Brody family’s lives. We watch 
as she watches awkward breakfasts and dinners, as Brody struggles with PTSD, as his wife 
Jessica attempts to hide an affair, as his daughter questions his behavior, etc. It is 
specifically not your typical surveillance scenario as it doesn’t necessarily invoke big 
government or allusions to the Panopticon since Carrie is very much not sanctioned by the 
state. Instead her female status and hidden bipolar disorder are often played out as 
inherently counter to the CIA’s methods, constantly undermining their system to follow 
through with any kind of hunch she may have by whatever means of rationalization she 
may come by. Any evidence she compiles is never guaranteed to strike any interest or sense 
of urgency with her superiors. Therefore, the Brody’s are being watched not by Big Brother 
but a rogue underground operation marked by mental illness within the female body. 
Homeland’s first season centers on the disruption this force causes as it infiltrates the 
family home. 
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The opening credits of Homeland features a black-and-white montage of its leading 
lady as a young girl. Images like the back of a pair of blonde pig tails gazing up at a 
television screen, another of a girl practicing the trumpet in conjunction with Louis 
Armstrong, a lone masked figure in the middle of a maze, an actual photo of a young Claire 
Danes dressed in a pea-coat, already sporting that wide-eyed stare. The jazz-infused 
montage of images is really the only moment in the show that references actual events in 
American history, as Carrie’s closed and flickering eyes flash against images of George 
Bush Sr., Bill Clinton, and a strangely upside-down Barack Obama. Amongst the 
presidents are iconic images of 9/11 – smoke billowing out of the Financial District, views 
from the Queens Expressway, news excerpts, etc. – all of which work to create a kind of 
tunnel vision in terms of Carrie’s state of mind, denoting a non-linear, non-logical way of 
viewing histories. This distinct vantage point also plays out within her bipolar disorder. 
This unique perspective is solidified with an audio bit of a conversation between her and 
Saul, where Carries attempts to explain her often times obsessive paranoia: 
Carrie: I missed something once before. I won’t – I can’t let that happen again! 
Saul: That was ten years ago. Everyone missed something that day. 
Carrie: “Yeah well everyone’s not me. 
Referring directly to 9/11, Homeland over and over again in its first season reminds us that 
Carrie is different from other intelligence workers in the field, that her responsibilities lie 
in a realm above those of her peers. She’s been thinking about these things since her 
girlhood. Scholar Alex Bevan writes that the “mental and bodily health of Carrie Mathison 
become battlegrounds for the series’ overarching questions about state surveillance and 
citizenship,” and goes on to propose that “rather than thinking of gender in Homeland as 
performance or lived experience, we might think of it as diagramming the integrities and 
ruptures in geopolitical selfhood and statehood.”75 Carrie tells us she was diagnosed with 
bipolar disorder at age 22-- as if, instead of considering motherhood as some women begin 
 80 
to do, her mental illness disrupts this “natural instinct” and redirects its protective qualities 
over the nation itself.  
Figure 2: Anne Hathaway as Carrie on SNL in 2012, mimicking Claire’s much 
discussed crying face paired with her penchant for wine and pills.  
Following Bevan, I understand the severity of Carrie Mathison’s gendered role 
within the series as illustrative of the ways current quality shows have worked to 
“understand” war, where Homeland funnels so much onto its female protagonist that Carrie 
Mathison takes on elements of the abject. To refer to Kristeva in her groundwork essay, 
“The Powers of Horror,” the abject can be defined as: 
 
A certain “ego” that merged with its master, a superego, has flatly driven it away. 
It lies outside, beyond the set, and does not seem to agree to the latter’s rules of the 
game. And yet, from its place of banishment, the abject does not cease challenging 
its master. Without a sign (for him), it beseeches a discharge, a convulsion, a crying 
out.76 
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Many reviews and parodies of Homeland are quick to call attention to Carrie 
Mathison’s cumbersome bottom lip and altogether exaggerated crying face. Beyond the 
physical, somewhat more obvious elements of horror embedded in her very facial 
expressions, I think it is useful to consider the multitude of extraneous, state sanctioned 
and otherwise, atrocities that happen unto Carrie and her unwavering willingness to return 
to her sacred “job.”  
Perhaps the inexplicable aspect of season one is that fact that Carrie instinctively 
knows from the very first episode that Brody harbors extremely violent intentions against 
the country yet she still falls in love with him. In addition to that emotional leap, Carrie 
also witnesses through her surveillance what can only be described as a rape scene in 
episode 1 when Brody aggressively throws his wife’s down on the bed and violently has 
sex with her despite obvious expressions of pain and confusion. It’s extremely difficult to 
watch, and even more startling to see it unacknowledged later in the show, both by the wife 
and by Carrie. It’s understood not as a rape but as a returned POW struggling to be intimate 
again. When Carrie and Brody do have sex for the first time, drunkenly in a car, it is 
similarly violent and yet Carrie is put in direct contrast with Brody’s wife in her enjoyment 
of it. Later, when the pair escape to a cabin in season two, she is being surveyed by her 
colleagues, Saul and Quinn, who argue over Carrie’s ability to remain objective – an 
argument accompanied by the audio of her climaxing reverberating throughout the control 
room. “No tell me really, I’d like your expert opinion,” angrily demands Quinn. “Is that 
someone turning something around or is that a stage five delusional getting laid?” Carrie’s 
pleasure here is made monstrous, as both her and Brody’s intentions become increasingly 
unclear, their coupling blurring national allegiance and transgressing familial bonds. 
In addition to often having her sex life surveyed, Carrie’s integrity and sense of 
sanity are routinely undermined or manipulated by people around her. In the first season, 
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Brody sells Carrie down the river, telling the CIA about their relationship and her continued 
“harassment” of him. He silences her with the inevitable charge of hysteria as she fails to 
convince Saul and others about Brody’s connection to Abu-Nassir. Brody is believed and 
Carrie is fired. When she asks Saul, “Why would he do that?” later in her pajamas in the 
fetal position in her bedroom, Saul must console her like a father would a daughter in the 
midst of heartbreak; she is utterly reduced amid her quiet sniffling. 
During the season one finale, in a last-ditch effort to get Brody’s daughter to talk 
Brody out of going through with Nassir’s attack, Carrie goes to their home in the flesh after 
surveilling it for months. The daughter calls the cops on her, unable to believe that her 
father could be a terrorist, and it’s as though Carrie has finally crossed enemy lines. She is 
then dragged across the front lawn in handcuffs as Brody’s wife and daughter look on. 
Unlike other women in combat genres, she is neither welcomed on the field nor in the 
home. It’s Carrie’s lowest, most frantic self after going to the last place she thought people 
might accept her musings, only to find the Brody family are the least aware of Brody’s 
intentions. “She’s sick!” the wife exclaims. Her failure to be accepted into any kind of 
space, whether domestic or otherwise, further emphasizes Carrie as an abject figure, unable 
to convince anyone of her theories.  “It’s crazy what you did,” Brody later tells her at the 
police station, as her bottom lip quivers. At this point she is finally surrenders to the insanity 
accusations and checks herself into a psych ward. She cages her own intuition and 
volunteers for electroshock therapy. To harken back to Basinger’s analysis of So Proudly 
We Hail, “She is in the catatonic state of the movie-story woman who tried to be a man, 
but found she was a woman after all (229).” Even though the audience knows Carrie is 
right about Brody – he had planned to detonate a suicide vest - we still must partake in 
watching her demise.  
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And yet, despite her epic falls, Carrie continues to rise up again. As if invoking 
Sylvia Plath, Homeland reincarnates Carrie almost every season. Like the figure of Lady 
Lazarus (“And I a smiling woman. / I am only thirty./ And like the cat I have nine times to 
die.”),77 Carrie rises from the dead over and over again as though nothing had ever 
occurred, as the everyone in her life ostracized her to the point of psychiatric treatment. 
After her first hospitalization, despite being distrusted and maligned and despite recently 
surviving a bombing (which she will go on to do countless times in the series) she is able 
to offer console to Saul, who doesn’t like seeing her in the hospital: “You didn’t do 
anything, Saul. I just came this way.” After years in the CIA, many of which stationed in 
Iraq, and being fiercely questioned along the way, Carrie is quick to relieve him of any 
guilt he may have over her emotional state. The cause of her trauma then is almost always 
rerouted back to her bipolar disorder, absolving the CIA, Brody, and everyone else of any 
responsibility toward her physical and mental state.  
The discomfort and disorder she puts her mind and body through ultimately labor 
toward clearing Brody’s name after the CIA headquarters is bombed. Like Saul, she has 
forgiven Brody in season two for no real explicable reason other than her own failure of 
“falling in love.” Despite her efforts in the second and third seasons, where she is again 
hospitalized, again bombed, and again furiously questioned along the way, changing 
leadership in the CIA fails to keep Brody alive after getting captured in Iran following a 
successful assassination mission. The Iranian asset that maneuvered the capture tells 
Carrie, “You’ve done what you set out to do. Which was for everyone to see in him what 
you see. That has happened. Everyone sees him through your eyes now.” Carrie’s love for 
Brody and enduring trauma culminates in his return to American patriot status.  Again, she 
quickly forgives and forgets what should be a tragic setback. The scene in which we first 
see her back from Tehran after Brody’s death is startlingly void of any backlash on her 
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part. Despite recently having watched her supposed soul mate die in a public hanging, she 
acts like a recently hired employee when she walks into the new CIA chief’s office where 
she’s offered the role of station chief in Istanbul. Even though she is in her third trimester 
with Brody’s baby, she remains in her black pantsuit, her bump hidden in her office drab 
look as though it might as well not even be there. No conversation occurs around the 
obvious elephant in the room – the father of the baby was publicly executed in Iran – nor 
does any question of maternity leave factor into the new position. As if a reset button was 
switched, Carrie continues onward like a cyborg. The following season she is reincarnated 
ominously as the “drone queen,” leaving her baby in the care of her sister.  In a 2017 
interview on Ellen, when asked what direction she’d like to see her character go in, Claire 
Danes answered with, “a little relief,” later going on to say she’d like to see Carrie play a 
game of monopoly with her daughter “just one time, some domestic bliss. I think she earned 
that. You could give that to her.” 
CONCLUSION 
The broad range and urgency of the US foreign and domestic conflicts get 
channeled through the intensification of Carrie’s abjectness in her status as a female 
intelligence analyst. While its categorization of “quality” suggest its interested in depicting 
complex, unexplored narratives, Homeland offers little beyond the gender boundaries 
already at play in other war media. By throwing Carrie into the equation, as if to confront 
Susan Jeffords’ claim head on that all war narratives work to exclude women, Homeland 
has only magnified the ways in which women and the “feminine” do not belong in the 
high-stakes scenarios of geopolitical strife, underlining the impossibility of understanding 
and retelling conflict beyond the scope of gender. Homeland’s main concern is not the war 
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on terror nor the changing political climate in the US; instead, its main focus centers on 
Carrie’s role in the center of it all and its inherent misplacement there.  
To return to the graffiti artists, Homeland is racist, but in the same way that 
characters on Mad Men are racist. It’s not that the show doesn’t care about Muslims or 
thinks all Muslims are going to assassinate the vice president, it’s that its formula doesn’t 
allow for anything else beyond the melodramatic and the hyperbolic. Carrie’s reality only 
exists if characters like Abu Nassir do too, where both figures take on the position of the 
abject in their banishment and their insistence on returning again and again. I do not say 
this as an apology for the show, but rather to understand why such characters and narratives 
operate. Homeland’s combination of melodrama and counter-terrorism, it seems, does not 
work to better represent the world but rather, works to view it in its most legible terms, 
where Carrie is a woman in a man’s world and her job is to fight bad guys. It only provides 
answers to our current geopolitical moment if you believe this construct is a meaningful 
one.   
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Conclusion: Reproductions of 9/11 and The Looming Tower 
Throughout this study, I have illustrated the many factors involved in our 
relationship with contemporary US wars/conflicts as they are depicted on our television 
screens. I have positioned genre and gender as centerpieces from which we negotiate the 
reproduction and repackaging of war narratives in order to examine how popularized 
versions of war reflect our understanding and expectations of television as a medium that 
both informs and entertains. I find this study significant not only because war media in 
general is a rather underdeveloped field, but also because of the effective cross-section 
television provides as a historically formulaic and gendered medium that frequently 
intersects with the often-veiled nature of our contemporary military conflicts. Some of the 
shows discussed in this study, like Army Wives, are too often disregarded as 
inconsequential or unimportant areas of study, while others, like Homeland, are considered 
legitimate forums to examine divisive US foreign policy and political structures. More 
intervention is needed to address this growing “info-tainment” divide. I have argued that 
soapy home-front based television can tell us as much about ourselves, if not more, than 
quality combat-driven television often postulates.  
For example, as I was writing this study, Hulu began airing a series focused entirely 
on the events leading up to the attacks on September 11th. The scripted political drama, The 
Looming Tower (2018), is Hulu’s most recent attempt at original programming following 
the success of The Handmaid’s Tale (2017). The series, an adaptation of the 2006 Pulitzer 
Prize-winning book by Lawrence Wright, is made up of ten hour-long episodes that depict 
the fissures between the CIA and the FBI that ultimately led to the hefty counter-
intelligence oversights leading up to 9/11. So, it felt rather serendipitous that while I was 
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examining post-9/11 television, the first series to focus on the attacks, which have informed 
the very sentiment and shape of texts examined earlier, would make its debut.  
Several popular films have depicted versions of 9/11 in various ways, whether 
recreating the attacks themselves (World Trade Center, 2006 and United 93, 2006), or 
evoking the event in a broader narrative about loss (Reign Over Me, 2007 and Extremely 
Loud and Incredibly Close, 2011), or staging them in a political intervention (Fahrenheit 
9/11, 2004). Hulu’s The Looming Tower is television’s most direct depiction of the event 
to date. Previously, television series that have depicted or referenced 9/11 have done so in 
singular “event” episodes. For example, The West Wing portrayed a White House 
lockdown during a fictional terrorist attack shortly after 9/11 while Law and Order depicted 
a murder investigation that was covered up by dumping the victim’s remains in Ground 
Zero. It has been evoked more broadly on television as an emotional backdrop as well, 
particularly in the 2004 FX series, Rescue Me, for example, where an NYC firefighter 
(played by Dennis Leary) mourns the loss of his best friend who was killed while trying to 
help get people out.   
The attacks have appeared in these minute ways rather consistently on television 
without much interrogation of their wider political meaning. The Looming Tower promises 
to do just that; its ten episodes lead-up to the day, starting in 1998 amidst the Monica 
Lewinsky scandal and ending on September 11th. As the title suggests, the event is 
“looming” as the series progresses, where the figure of John O’Neill (Jeff Daniels), who 
died in the attacks, is often shown walking to and from a downtown Manhattan apartment 
with the towers standing ominously in the background.  
The series is for all intents and purposes, a “quality” television show, checking off 
the formal pedigree requirements: a limited series run, based on “true” events (already 
depicted in an award-winning book by an award-winning author), created by an established 
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documentary filmmaker (Alex Gibney), and housed on a subscription-based streaming 
service. Additionally, the narrative itself is a story about big personalities in the CIA and 
the FBI colliding, featuring (unsurprisingly) difficult, unlikeable men at the helm of this 
confrontation. In direct opposition is O’Neill, the former head of the New York City FBI 
division of counter-terrorism, and Martin Schmidt (played by Peter Sarsgaard), the head of 
the CIA’s Al Qaeda unit at the time. O’Neill wants less military intervention in places like 
Yemen and Saudi Arabia while Schmidt wants more, their spar ultimately leading the CIA 
to withhold information, some of it relating to the hijackers, who had entered the US over 
a year before the attack. The series’ unsung heroes are Richard Clarke (Michael Stuhlbarg), 
the National Coordinator for Security, and Ali Soufan (Tahar Rahim), a Lebanese-
American FBI agent working under O’Neill, one of eight Arabic speaking agents in the 
entire bureau at the time of the attacks. The two are portrayed as diligent investigators 
whose work gets ignored by higher powers. O’Neill’s story is arguable the primary 
emotional arc of the show and indeed, his death is a rather extraordinary one to those 
unaware of Wright’s book. After sparring with both the CIA and his own colleagues within 
the bureau over their mishandling of Al Qaeda threats, as well as some personal and 
financial problems, O’Neill was forced to retire from the FBI. He then took a position as 
the head of security at the World Trade Center just two weeks before the attacks.  
Yet Jeff Daniel portrays O’Neill as an arrogant and unpleasant individual, and the 
series itself is intently focused on depicting the disarray of the man’s personal life alongside 
his increasingly tenuous position at the FBI, where his juggling of extramarital affairs, 
pervasive tendency to lie, and misuse of FBI funds are posited as coinciding with the 
bureaucratic, perhaps even moral failings, leading up to the attacks. “In the book, Mr. 
Wright gives a few pages to Mr. O’Neill’s byzantine romantic life, as a counterpoint to 
Islamist attitudes toward women and sex,” notes The New York Times. “This gets a fuller, 
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but (so far) less relevant treatment on screen.”78 Indeed, The Looming Tower television 
series is preoccupied with the personal lives of the American men it examines. Martin’s 
stubbornness is corroborated by his female colleague with whom he has a relationship, and 
who ultimately takes on the task of withholding information after he is fired. Her character, 
played by Diane Marsh, is painstakingly icy, where one scene in particular depicts her 
luxuriously applying lipstick in a mirror as she declines to share vital information with 
colleagues. Her inexplicable loyalty to Martin makes her one of the show’s more one-
dimensionally characters, casting her as a downright villain. On the flipside, Soufan’s 
relationship with his Muslim identity is framed by his burgeoning love life with a white 
female elementary school teacher, a vision of white Western virtue.  
Given its subject matter, the series spends an arguably inordinate amount of time 
dwelling on these personal relationships. Using its female characters predominately as 
cyphers, The Looming Tower is preoccupied with both the personal corruption and subtle 
heroism of its male players. “About 80 percent of Mr. Wright’s text didn’t involve 
Americans. It was about, and told from the point of view of, Middle Easterners. [The 
Looming Tower] has reduced the story to that other 20 percent” (Hale). Indeed, at its most 
absurd and telling moment, the series insists briefly on showing the hijackers spending 
time in Las Vegas strip clubs in the days preceding the attacks.79 Despite showcasing 
features more akin to the documentary form – utilizing a Pulitzer prize-winning source, 
depicting real attacks like the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, and even employing actual 
footage of Bin Laden, nonetheless, the series relies on myth to illustrate the timeline of the 
hijackers. While later investigations revealed the men involved in the attacks spent time in 
Las Vegas, there is no evidence this time was specifically spent getting private lap dances 
and taking drugs, as tabloids, intent on revealing some moral hypocrisy, had reported after 
the attack.80  The series’ perpetuation of this myth is telling. When it diverges from 
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grounded truths and takes creative license, it does so to illustrate an extremely gendered 
scenario, where the strip club functions to delegitimize the hijacker’s hatred against the 
US. As if to say, “See, they too enjoy the ‘western’ objectification of women, just like 
O’Neill, Martin, and Soufan do.” Thus, instead of exploring the intentions and hatred 
behind the attack, The Looming Tower relies on tired tropes, using women and women’s 
bodies to illustrate the downfall and disorder of the men in control and at play. 
So far, the series has been met with high praise. GQ called The Looming Tower as 
a political drama that “actually has something to say.”81 Vanity Fair called it “Hulu’s 
second Trump-Era must-watch.”82 Yet some publications, including The New York Times, 
have been less enthused, expressing frustration with the generic crime formulas the series 
falls back on. Slate writes, “The Looming Tower turns a Pulitzer-Winning account of how 
9/11 happened into a half-season of CSI.”83 The Looming Tower is, then, either a new, 
must-watch take on 9/11 or it’s just another cable drama.   
Indeed, the changing landscape of serial television provides a complex forum to 
examine popular conceptions of our ongoing wars and events like 9/11. As Jeanine 
Basinger’s work on war genres has demonstrated, the popular narrative surrounding even 
the largest of global conflicts will eventually be parsed over and shaped into recognizable 
formula sets. I hope that this study has illustrated the importance of tracing the landscape 
around these formulas to better locate, contextualize, and understand them in their 
inevitable reproductions in the future. As every major US war has seen its events shaped 
and reshaped through television decades past its end, so too will the conflicts in the Middle 
East and here at home, as we already seen start to happen. These reproductions have tended 
towards the self-referential mode and most likely will continue to do so. It is important to 
acknowledge these reproductions as just that, reproductions, often unmoored to the reality 
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of the conflicts being restaged but rather, tethered to its previous depictions and pre-
existing televisual formulas.  
What’s perhaps most telling about The Looming Tower and its divided reception is 
the apparent desire of American audiences to learn something new about 9/11. Its 
investigative aesthetic is admittedly appealing in contrast to our current moment often 
dictated by the fast-paced Twittersphere of “fake news.” The series then feels long-form 
journalistic reprieve. Whether or not The Looming Tower can say actually something new 
about 9/11, and more broadly, whether or not television can answer our growing concerns 
about our wars abroad, are questions I will open for further study. More definitively, what 
the shows described in this study do illustrate is the persistent need to fill gaps of 
knowledge about our contemporary conflicts too often left open for TV to fill up. 
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